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Introduction 
The history of the Promaucae and Picunche Indians of Central Chile remains 
unwritten. Even though more than 450 years have elapsed since the events that 
brought about their extinction, the Indian people are still mere shadows on the 
epic canvas painted by the Europeans and their descendants. The vanquished 
paid for their defeat with their freedom and then with the memory of their 
deeds.1 
In other papers I have tried to redress this unbalanced view of our national 
past by concentrating on the history of the 'forgotten' Indians. Firstly, I studied 
the native resistance against Inca expansionism and evaluated its degree of 
success;2 then I gathered information about the military resistance against the 
Spaniards, highlighting the peak period between 1541 and 1545.3 In a third 
work I reconstructed the 'discourses' of the lonkos, as they were related by 
European witnesses, in order to show the Indian view of the war against the 
Spanish crown.4 In this present paper I will examine both the collapse of tribal 
society due to the effects of the war fought to acquire control of the Central 
Valley of Chile and the policies implemented by the conquistadores to support 
and preserve the defeated Picunches and Promaucaes. 
Military history is justifiably criticised for confining itself to accounts of 
battles and heroes; it is possible to extend the history of conflicts, however, 
beyond these traditional limits to provide a better understanding of the context 
in which particular wars have taken place and their social consequences. I will 
attempt to achieve this by studying the economic and social resistance that 
accompanied the Picunche and Promaucae military effort between 1541-1555 
and its impact upon indigenous society. I will also examine the efforts made by 
the Spaniards to reconstruct tribal society, a contradictory process that took place 
at the same time as these events and which has been overlooked by the 
traditional historiography of Chile. Our chronology is based on the understanding 
that the struggle to halt imperial expansionism in Central Chile was a process 
that began with the war against the Inca in the early decades of the sixteenth 
century, and finished in 1558 with the defeat of cacique Lautaro on the banks 
of the Mataquito river. 
Over and above historical distortions and literary fiction, there are enough 
sources and direct testimonies to allow the historian to throw light on the 
ferocious and violent resistance mounted by the inhabitants of Central Chile 
against the invaders.5 It is important to establish this basic fact because there 
is still a widespread belief that the Inca and Spanish conquests of Santiago and 
the surrounding districts were carried out without great difficulty and that the 
Picunches surrendered without much resistance.6 Benjamin Vicuna Mackenna 
wrote almost a century ago that the Picunches were of 'an inferior nature, servile 
and treacherous'. 7 Inspired by his racist prejudices, Francisco Antonio Encina 
pointed out in his well-known Historia de Chile: T h e military energy of the 
Picunches and Huilliches was far inferior to that of the Araucanians, not only 
in their strength and tenacity but also in the development of their military 
imagination.'8 The Picunche Indian, wrote Rene Leon Echaiz, as recently as 
1971, 'was not bellicose but peaceful and lived committed to his agricultural 
work in his small villages . . . He knew and bore with goodwill first the 
invasion of the Incas and then that of the Spaniards'.9 Distortions like these and 
mistaken beliefs that the magnificent garrisoned villages and fortresses recently 
unearthed in Central Chile could only have been built by the Incas stem from 
ignorance of the history and archaeology of the Picunches and Promaucaes.10 
The so-called Promaucaes (mountain wolves) were not only deprived of their 
lands but, like other indigenous people in the continent, their culture was also 
stolen. 
The main fact that I want to establish in this paper is that the early extinction 
of Picunches and Promaucaes was caused by one of the bloodiest wars ever 
fought in Chile. Imperial expansionism and Indian resistance were the two sides 
of the military confrontation brought about by the Spanish invasion, and 
extermination of the indigenous people was its most visible outcome. The 
actions of the vanquished left no major traces, simply because there was no-one 
left to record the actions of lonkos and conas.u Once they were conquered, the 
Picunches and Promaucaes were forced to generate the economic surplus that 
made possible the European expansion to Bio-bio and were recruited to join the 
imperial armies as auxiliares in the war against the southern Araucanian tribes. 
Eventually, the combination of both the ferocity of the war and the 
over-exploitation of their lands paved the way for the early extinction of one of 
the most indomitable of the tribal peoples of the continent. 
The evidence on which this paper is based has been drawn from 
contemporary sources such as the Relaciones de meritos, Probanzas and 
Informaciones presented by the conquistadores to the crown,12 the letters of 
governor Pedro de Valdivia, the minutes of the Cabildo (Town Council) of 
Santiago and the chronicles written by Vivar, Marino de Lobera and Gongora 
Marmolejo. Several concepts and interpretations are based on modern studies of 
Inca and Spanish rule in the region.n 
The War of the Pukaraes 
The war to resist the establishment of imperial control of the Central Valley of 
Chile was much more than a mere military event. The struggle against the Inca 
and the Spaniards included economic sabotage, flight to the mountains and, at 
its most dramatic moment, collective suicide. The war of the Promaucaes and 
Picunches against the invaders was violent and total. 
In other regions of the continent, the Europeans either established alliances 
with the natives or created a world of co-existence that enabled them to 
consolidate their territorial gains. This process was facilitated in Peru and 
Mexico by the presence of sophisticated social and political institutions 
dominated by a state apparatus; forced labour, tributes and military service were 
well known to the natives of those regions. When the Spaniards established their 
system of imperial control, some of their own institutions simply replaced the 
old. In the periphery of the Andean empires, the presence of powerful chieftains 
and local warlords made alliances possible between the invaders and some local 
factions and helped to establish joint dominion over common neighbours. Thus, 
political pacts and the relatively simple replacement of one system of imperial 
domination by another made the war of conquest less bloody and sometimes 
unnecessary. Throughout the Andean lands, annexation and co-option rather than 
war became the rule. 
In Central Chile the situation was different. The Spaniards found an 
'incomplete' system of Inca domination, peppered with small, independent 
Picunche enclaves. South of the Maipo river, they found the Promaucaes, a tribal 
society which could not be conquered by the men of Cuzco.14 The first Spanish 
forays led by Diego de Almagro in 1536 used the system established by the Inca 
and advanced to the geographical frontiers of the Collasuyu province without 
much difficulty; helped by his Inca allies and supported by the caciques of the 
northern valleys, the journey towards Central Chile was almost unhindered.15 
Only the weather and the terrain presented an obstacle to El Adelantado 
Almagro. Yet by the Maipo or Maule river the Spanish conqueror encountered 
the ferocious resistance of the Promaucaes. A few days later, Almagro returned 
to Cuzco leaving behind a trail of pillage, burnt settlements and death.16 
Four years after Almagro a new, smaller, expedition left Peru to conquer the 
southern lands. It was led by Pedro de Valdivia and was composed of 156 men. 
In the meantime, Inca rule in Chile was collapsing and the whole region was 
being rocked by internecine warfare, tribal expansionism and the emergence of 
new military leaders. To establish themselves, Valdivia and his men used the 
rudimentary material and political infrastructure left by the Incas in Santiago; 
they also proceeded to exploit the divisions which prevailed between the 
inhabitants of Mapocho and the powerful Picunche enclaves of the Aconcagua 
and Chile valleys. A few days after their arrival in Santiago, the Spaniards held 
a parley with 11 caciques of Santiago valley and the last representatives of 
Cuzco rule to establish their first military alliance against chiefs Michimalonko 
and Tanjalonko of Aconcagua valley.17 
The long-term success of the enterprise led by General Valdivia depended 
upon the completion of this political and military pact with the people of 
Santiago and the submission of the northern and southern tribes; but the strong 
resistance found by the Inca south of the Maipo river and the military power of 
the Aconcagua and Chile valleys had already shown that the establishment of 
Spanish imperial rule was not going to be easy. 
The presence of strong chieftainships in Aconcagua, Chile and Cachapoal 
made Indian resistance possible. Historically, Aconcagua and Cachapoal had 
learnt well from their military struggles with the Incas and had managed to halt 
Almagro's attempts to conquer their lands; strong leadership and experience 
gave them confidence to wage an all-out war against the men led by Valdivia. 
This mixture of history and social development explains in part both the 
arrogance of the Picunche and Promaucae leaders and the brutal character of the 
new war for the control of Central Chile which took place between 1541 and 
1545. 
The final military campaign carried out by Pedro de Valdivia against the 
Promaucaes in 1545 brought about Spanish control of the lands situated between 
the Maipo and Maule rivers without major bloodshed. This was the region where 
anti-Spanish resistance had been most successfully organised since 1541 and 
where hundreds, if not thousands, of warriors sought shelter. For at least four 
years the Maipo and Maule provinces had become the symbolic strongholds of 
local Indian resistance. However, in the end, the Promaucaes and their allies put 
down their weapons and abandoned their lands. 
The sudden collapse of Promaucae and Picunche resistance in 1545 is difficult 
to understand in the light of the widespread conflict which had prevailed in 
Central Chile since 1541. The available records are biased. The soldiers of the 
conquest emphasised how easily they had achieved the occupation of the lands 
south of Maipo and they manipulated the facts to persuade the crown and other 
soldiers to support their endeavours. Historians writing later simply repeated 
these assertions and perpetuated the myth of the 'easy' conquest of Santiago and 
the surrounding districts. Both conveniently forgot to mention that the last 
campaign against the Promaucaes took place after four years of intensive 
warfare and in the context of persistent native anti-expansionist resistance since 
the beginning of the century. 
In the spring of 1544 Valdivia received human reinforcements and material 
supplies from Peru which renewed the strength of his forces; it is possible that 
the sight of these new contingents cowed the natives, but the defeatist attitude 
taken by the Promaucaes cannot be explained solely in terms of greater Spanish 
military power. In fact, the increases in European men and supplies probably did 
not have a dramatic impact as the starting point of recovery for the Spanish 
forces was indeed very low. Why then did Indian resistance cease so suddenly? 
The answer to this question is elusive, especially if we leave aside the traditional 
interpretation based on European racial and technological superiority. However, 
we may learn about the causes of defeat by analysing the character of the war 
waged by the Indians to protect their lands and their freedom from Inca 
enchroachment and Spanish expansionism. In other words, the answer may lie 
in the way the Indians defended their country. 
Ever since the early days of the sixteenth century, the Picunches and 
Promaucaes of Central Chile had fought against repeated attempts by the armies 
of Cuzco to impose imperial control over their lands. They resisted the armies 
sent by the Inca by implementing a military strategy designed to exert control 
over the valleys and lowlands through the establishment of garrisons in specially 
fortified mountain fortresses. Thus, for several decades, hillforts and mountain 
settlements flourished on the hills of Santiago and the neighbouring territories 
to a degree never before witnessed in the area. 
The architecture of the Indian forts, pukaraes or al-barradas was formidable. 
They were built on the tops of hills or by the sides of lakes. Their construction 
consisted of dry-stone walls, palisades, earthworks and ramparts surrounded by 
flooded fields, woods, swamps and flooded ditches. Some of these constructions 
encircled the hill slopes while in other cases they only strengthened unprotected 
areas between natural cliffs and precipices. In most cases, two or three dry-stone 
walls encircled the hills. Within the walls there were dwellings, wells and ritual 
spaces; although some of the fortifications seemed to have been temporary 
refuges, in at least one case the Spanish soldiers counted one hundred huts. 
Well-built paths and reinforced gates also indicated the presence of more 
permanent settlements. The style of construction was inconsistent, reflecting 
perhaps the lack of a centralised authority, but in all cases the thrust of the forts 
was directed towards control of the low valleys and the defence of neighbouring 
farm fields, routes of exchange and strategic passes. In time of war, the warriors 
marched to these fortifications to defend the rights of the tribe.18 
The strategy of fortified warfare was again implemented to resist Almagro 
and Valdivia. Thus, between 1541 and 1545, at least 18 positions were fortified 
and defended against the Spaniards, not counting the forts built by the Indians 
of Santiago who in those years operated in alliance with Valdivia. The Spaniards 
themselves built 'casas-fuertes ' in Santiago, Apalta, Maule, Limache and 
Quintero.19 Eventually, the war to gain or to retain control of the Central 
Valley consisted primarily of two armies firmly secured behind the walls of their 
forts making forays against the lands and farms of the enemy. As shown in later 
pictographs, the hilltops were dominated by two fortresses, one native and the 
other Spanish, facing each other while the armies skirmished in the low, flat 
lands.20 
The Promaucae and Picunche tribal federations displaced their economic and 
material resources to the hillforts in order to sustain the war effort against the 
invaders. The aim of the local strategists was twofold. On the one hand they 
wanted to protect the Indians who worked the lands in the valleys, while on the 
other they sought to deprive the conquerors of their most valuable need: fresh 
food. When Valdivia entered the land in 1541, this type of fortified warfare 
already had a long history and some of the local hillforts, like Aconcagua, 
Mauco and Angostura, had gained prestige and fame for their massive buildings, 
their key locations and the bravery of their garrisons. In Central Chile, the 
Spaniards found a people who were well experienced in fortified warfare and 
who were determined to repeat the old tactics that had succeeded in halting Inca 
expansionism and that had led to the disastrous retreat of Almagro in 1536. 
The concentration of men and resources, especially food and animals, in the 
defended settlements in the mountains was a reasonable tactic, particularly if the 
invaders lacked their own means of subsistence. Nevertheless, in 1541 the great 
majority of the Indians were not in a position to take the war of the forts to its 
ultimate conclusion, exhausted as they were by the long war against the Incas 
and by the severe battles with Almagro. Worse still, Valdivia and his men were 
not cut from the same cloth as those who manned the marauding expeditions 
which left Cuzco in search of gold and silver and who returned quickly to sell 
their booty. Valdivia's men were genuine settlers, who left Peru with 
vine-plants, pigs and hens and the aim of finding a land to live in peacefully. 
They were the veterans of past military enterprises, the ragged scum of the new 
Spanish towns, who had realised that their military adventures were over. When 
they reached Mapocho, they found that it was almost identical to the lands they 
had left in the Spanish peninsula and the area in which they founded their first 
village they named Nueva Extremadura. In any event, their determination was 
to stay regardless of the cost and despite the intrigues and plots of those who 
had joined the enterprise to make quick fortunes and who, in view of the evident 
poverty of the land, advocated a return to Peru. 
For short conflicts, the war of the pukaraes offered many advantages to the 
local tribal fractions; but these advantages diminished with the passing of time. 
Eventually, the warriors who had secured themselves on the tops of inaccessible 
mountains were cut off from the lowlands, saw their stocks depleted and 
witnessed raids against their settlements. This was the case during the war of 
resistance against Valdivia which went on for more than four years. Thus, the 
very success of the war of the forts became the weakest link in the overall 
strategy of resistance against the Europeans. 
Every time the Spaniards raided Indian settlements and farms situated in the 
districts surrounding Santiago, they found no people, food or animals. In a sense, 
the Promaucaes had won the first phase of the war by depriving the Spaniards 
of fresh supplies of foodstuffs and other goods made by the tribes. The 
deprivation suffered by the Spaniards was noted afterwards in a title of 
encomienda: '. . . and you were among those who populated the said city of 
Santiago and helped to support it during the war, battles, pacification and 
conquest [of] the natives who were settled in the district of the said city of 
Santiago, a war that was very laborious and dangerous, because the Indians were 
very bellicose and were prepared for battle and skirmishes and built many forts 
and albarradas\2X But as Valdivia's men starved, they displayed an 
extraordinary zeal in the search for something to eat: the Picunche settlements 
were ransacked and men and women were tortured to obtain information about 
the whereabouts of hidden supplies. Antonio de Herrera wrote in his Historia 
general: '[Valdivia] sought refuge in the fort of Santiago, and supplied its needs 
by raiding the lands, always fighting with the enemies'.22 
The Picunche and Promaucae forts, the last strongholds of Indian resistance 
and the storehouses of much-needed supplies, were overrun with renewed 
eagerness. Ransacking and pillage, initially never intended by Valdivia and his 
men, became a common practice as discipline and morale declined and death by 
starvation became a real threat. The conquistadores of Castile became a bunch 
of starved and desperate looters whose appetite was not so much for gold but 
for mundane grain, milk and clothing. The fact that the Spaniards alone had 
horses gave them a mobility in their search for food that allowed them to attack 
the forts and to steal the hidden food stores before the Promaucaes had their 
defences in place. 
The war of raids and pillage began after the destruction of Santiago in 
September 1541. 'The General [Valdivia] knew that the Indians did not want to 
give us a rest; he decided to make them understand and to teach them a lesson. 
This became the main target for him and his men. He went out of the city with 
sixty men and marched to destroy the pucaranes [sic] or fortresses they had in 
their provinces because it was from there that they came to raid our lands and 
where they sought refuge. Thus, at least twenty-five riders were always attacking 
the Indian lands. And then, after ten or fifteen days, they returned to Santiago 
and another squad would go out with their respective leaders. The Spaniards 
gave the Indians no time to rest. And the Indians, seeing that they could have 
not even an hour of peace or quiet, began to go away.'23 
It was during these days of intensive war that the legend originated of the 
zupais, the tireless evil white men who traversed the land raiding stores and 
burning Indian villages. If elsewhere in the continent the Spaniards rode in 
search of fortune, in Central Chile they galloped ceaselessly looking for food. 
The poet-soldier Ercilla wrote in this respect: 'Not without great risks /and loss 
of their lives/ they survived besieged for six years./ Eating tasteless wild roots,/ 
they maintained their tired bodies'. Vivar described the return of one of the 
columns sent out to loot Indian villages: They brought some yanacona Indians 
loaded with maize. They were welcomed for their capability and great 
achievement because it is praiseworthy that the Spaniards, being so few and so 
isolated from any source of support, had been able to fight such a brave and 
barbarian people and to come out victors.'24 Ironically, the scarce economic 
surpluses accumulated by the tribes in past years and stored in the pukaraes 
went to feed the starved forces of Valdivia. 
Despite the risks they ran from the constant attack of guerrilla groups and 
regardless of the sacrifices involved in the expeditions to the Indian lands, the 
Spaniards renewed their efforts to capture the forts in order to transport the 
stored food back to the capital. Meanwhile, they were also breaking the material 
foundations upon which the Indian military effort rested. 
The destruction of the undefended settlements in the lowlands was an inherent 
part of the costs of fortified war as practised by the Picunches and Promaucaes. 
The Indians were able to minimise the loss of food after the capture of the forts 
by reducing the quantity of provisions stored and constructing secret silos. Even 
the greater mobility of the Spanish forces was neutralised by the building of 
ditches, the flooding of lands and the placing of forts on the tops of inaccessible 
mountain peaks. Yet the Indian leadership had no way of counteracting the 
devastating effects of a long war. 
The building and victualling of the pukaraes and their garrisons for almost 
five years of permanent conflict simply exhausted the capacity of tribal society 
to generate additional resources to feed their warriors. As was pointed out by 
witnesses, the warriors and their women and children had to be fed with goods 
that were becoming scarce. One solution was to migrate to the lands of the 
south. 'All the chiefs and natives of these lands', wrote Vivar, 'went to the 
Province of the Pormocaes [sic], to a fort that they had built with the purpose 
of refusing to serve us and with the intention that, having their women and 
children there well protected, they could come out and fight us in this city and 
kill the people who served us'. 
While the number of Indians who sought refuge behind the walls of the forts 
in the south grew bigger as the Spaniards successfully entered the lands of 
Cachapoal, the numbers who could carry on working the land, collecting roots 
and fruits, maintaining channels and terraces and hunting and fishing became 
even smaller. On the other hand, the building of more complex forts with 
ditches, solid walls, wells and secret silos required the massive participation of 
all those able to work. Thus, the development of the conflict for a longer period 
and the new military requirements forced the displacement of the increasingly 
small economic force. Finally, the defence of the fortresses, the accumulation 
of missiles, the manufacturing of arrows, the deployment of scouts and 
watchmen and the ceremonial tasks associated with the tactics of the fortified 
war stretched the capacity of tribal society to the point of collapse. The war of 
the pukaraes required a high investment of energies and imposed severe 
economic penalties which the Picunches and Promaucaes could not sustain for 
an indefinite period of time. 
Militarily, the inhabitants of Central Chile did not develop a pan-tribal 
political system that could enable them to coordinate the movement of human 
and material resources throughout the land. The local political system, based 
around the basic social unit composed of extended families, was adequate to 
sustain guerrilla warfare but could not cope with the development of fixed 
military fronts. There was a real need to articulate the strategy and the tactics 
of the fortified war but there was nobody to do it. In a sense, the emergence of 
the lonkos who commanded the loyalty of larger tribal segments came too late 
to deal with the needs and problems of overall leadership created by the new 
war. Moreover, with the exception of the massive attack against Santiago in 
September 1541, the Picunches and Promaucaes were reluctant to move the 
focus of conflict to the city and its surrounding districts. It is true that they were 
successful in besieging the Spaniards for almost four years; it is also true that 
they could not stop Valdivia and his men from slipping through their 
undisciplined lines to attack positions in the rearguard. In consequence, lack of 
coordination and mobility exposed the warriors to the constant and systematic 
attacks of the Spanish cavalry. With the help of yanaconas and auxiliares, the 
Spaniards managed to move the military front to the heart of the free Promaucae 
lands and introduced the war of the maloca (raids), taking full advantage of their 
greater mobility. 
Traditionally, the pukaraes had been a valuable defensive device used by the 
Indians to repel invaders. The last time that they proved their worth was in 
1536, when Almagro was forced to return empty-handed to Peru. Nevertheless, 
Almagro and his men were typical adventurers who marched out to the 
periphery in search of gold and booty, while the band of desesperados led by 
Valdivia were men determined not only to rob but to conquer as well. They 
were the archetype of the new colonisers who were founding towns and villages 
throughout the known lands of the sub-continent. Faced with the frightening 
zupais, the Picunches and Promaucaes made the mistake of returning to the 
hillforts with their women, belongings and food. Thus the pukaraes became 
death traps in which the Indians suffered the full impact of the Spanish fury and 
European military superiority. 
The horse, firearms and their long experience in fortified warfare favoured the 
Europeans and decided the military fate of the local tribes. While the Spaniards 
raided the Picunche and Promaucae villages and several columns made 
incursions into the tribal heartlands, the Indians continued building their 
magnificent fortresses, which most of the time they could not even finish before 
the Spaniards attacked them. Unexpectedly, technological superiority had made 
the war of the pukaraes obsolete. The Indians, stubbornly persisting in their old 
tactics, overstretched the material resources of their tribal society and thus paved 
the way for their own defeat. 
The Economic War 
The demand for extraordinary resources to sustain the material demands of the 
war of the pukaraes came about precisely when the Indian leadership had 
decided to destroy all the food supplies that could have helped the survival of 
the Spaniards in Santiago. In 1545, Valdivia wrote to Emperor Carlos V that 
after the burning and destruction of Santiago the Indians had intensified their 
hostility, 'refusing to plant, staying alive by eating a kind of onion and a 
nutritious grain that looks like oats'. In another communication the governor 
repeated: 'they were so arrogant that they refused to till their lands in order to 
make war against us'. In his letter to his attorneys at the Spanish court, written 
in 1550, the Castilian general added further details about the extraordinary 
resistance of the natives of Central Chile: 'when they realised that we were 
cultivating the land and had no intention of leaving, in order to force us to go 
back they kept fighting all the time and everywhere; they did not plant but kept 
themselves alive by eating some onions and other legumes that grow wild in the 
land'.25 Vivar described the attitude of the Indians after September 1541 in 
similar terms: 'They came together and then all went to war, and they hid their 
supplies and everything they owned . . . They had sown little maize and not like 
they used to do in older times; their intention was that, once the Spaniards had 
seen that there were few plots planted, they would not wait to harvest them, so 
that with so few provisions they would either die or would abandon the country. 
If they were to stay, then they would be killed on the one side by hunger and 
on the other by war'.26 Chronicler Pedro Marino de Lobera described similar 
scenes: 'they resolved that it would be better to seek refuge in the most hidden 
parts of the land, where it would be difficult for the Spaniards to find them, 
withdrawing their services and supplies; they also decided to halt the cultivation 
of the land or to harvest their chacaras, in order that the Spaniards would lack 
all means of subsistence. Then they would be forced either to starve to death or 
to go back to their countries in search of food.'27 
The drastic stoppage of all economic activities was a dramatic gesture of 
defiance designed to put additional pressure on the Spaniards besieged in 
Santiago. Cut off from Peru by the formidable resistance of the Aconcagua 
warriors led by Michimalonko and Tanjalonko, Valdivia and his men had no 
sources of food other than what they could obtain from the neighbouring 
districts. The decision to stop producing food was apparently honoured by the 
majority of lineages settled in the Central Valley. Marino de Lobera indicated: 
Th is was the best trick they could devise to accomplish their aims; by 
agreement it was decreed that they should cease immediately any sort of 
cultivation, a decree that was unanimously obeyed to such a point that the whole 
country became extremely poor and sterile.'28 
The destruction of the food supplies and the dismantling of the tribal 
economic network was not a mere tactical device but was part of the strategy 
of resistance put in motion from the very first days of Valdivia's arrival in 
Santiago. 'The Indians of this country', wrote a soldier, 'ceased to sow the land 
from the days the Christians came.'29 Valdivia himself described in a letter to 
Hernando de Pizarro the difficulties he encountered when he entered Chile: 'It 
took me eleven months [to reach Santiago] and this delay was caused by the 
hard labour we had in finding food that the Indians hid so well that not even the 
Devil could find it.'30 'The Indians fought for four years', pointed out Captain 
Rodrigo de Quiroga in 1564, 'and did not want to sow the land on the 
understanding that hunger would force us to leave the town.'31 Pedro de Artano 
declared in 1558 that 'he knew and saw that for more than two years the natives 
of these provinces did not want to work the land and fled to the mountains and 
survived eating grapes, wild onions and other herbs'.32 
The Indians used hunger and the threat of starvation as an additional weapon 
in their war of resistance. They expected that, however painful it was, the 
destruction of food and supplies would eventually lead to victory as in the days 
of Diego de Almagro. In this respect, Gabriel de la Cruz affirmed that 'owing 
to the war with the said Indians they refused to plant or to work their 
sementeras, thinking that this would force the Spaniards to go away from their 
lands, as in the times of Diego de Almagro'.33 Juan Godinez, a veteran soldier 
who took part in Almagro's expedition and then joined Valdivia's to become 
one of the most powerful men in the new colony, wrote that the Indians 'made 
war by not planting, having it for certain that they would force us out of the 
land, and thus they did not work their fields for many years'.34 Francisco de 
Riberos wrote that the Picunches and Promaucaes 'rebelled for more than five 
years, not sowing the land and believing that as Don Diego de Almagro had 
returned to Peru in the past so would the said Governor don Pedro de Valdivia 
be forced to do so on this occasion'.35 The inhabitants of Central Chile geared 
the tribal economy totally towards the war effort. 
Cut off from the imperial forces in Peru and condemned to survive in a 
situation of almost total siege, the Spaniards fully realised that the hunger-war 
was complementary to the war of the pukaraes. Francisco de Riberos pointed 
out that the Indians 'cease to work in order to raise the stakes in their war'.36 
The natives, another soldier pointed out, 'stop sowing the land thinking that it 
would force the Christians to leave'.37 Santiago de Azocar added that Picunches 
and Promaucaes 'always tried to resist the Christians and fought to throw them 
out of their kingdom, and for this reason they agreed to stop sowing'.38 
Apparently, all the northern tribal segments joined in this dual strategy. 
According to Diego de Rosales, who wrote his chronicle about eighty years 
later, this dramatic decision was taken by the Indians of Aconcagua, Limarf, 
Coquimbo, Illapel and Chuapa, Copiapo and Santiago. During a pan-tribal 
gathering, the Jesuit observed, 'they agreed to withdraw all food, supplies and 
livestock, and took everything of value with them to the mountains and then 
built their fortresses on the tops of high peaks'.39 
The scarcity of food and supplies did not achieve its target but it had a 
serious impact on the morale of the conquistadores. In fact, a review of all 
contemporary Informaciones, Relaciones and Probanzas available shows that the 
severe lack of food and provisions became traumatic for the Europeans; they 
repeatedly asserted that those had been very hard and laborious days, especially 
during the siege of 1541-1544. 'We suffered great hardships, were very needy 
and experienced great risks to our lives' - observed Hernan Paez - 'because we 
had to fight so often with the Indians and lacked food; there was such a large 
shortage that the Europeans dressed in the skins of the wild animals they had 
killed for food, and survived feeding on wild herbs and bad food, of little value 
and bad taste, all because the Indians did not want to sow the land for several 
years.'40 Pedro de Leon wrote: 'in all the Yndias there has never been anything 
like what took place in this country because besides the great war and battles 
they gave us . . . the said natives decided not to work the land for six years and 
it caused us great hardships'.41 Pedro de Herrera, another companion of 
Valdivia, pointed out in 1558 that during the conquest and pacification of the 
Central Valley 'we went through great and excessive hardships . . . because no 
ship came to this land and the Indians, in order to force us to abandon their 
country, did not want to serve'.42 The inhabitants of Santiago, declared Juan 
Carmona in 1564, lived in a state of such misery during the war with the 
Promaucaes that they 'were dressed in the furs of foxes, dogs, seals and cats'.43 
If the Indians' strategy based on the threat of starvation was decisive in the 
successful outcome of the conflict with Almagro, it had less impact in the war 
against the men led by Valdivia. While Almagro's men were soldiers of fortune, 
the men who accompanied Valdivia were genuine colonists determined to 
prosper in the harsh conditions they met in Santiago. Furthermore, the military 
siege imposed by the Indians from September 1541 left the new conquerors with 
no options; isolated and starved, the Castilians had to fight not just for conquest 
but also for their own survival. As Vivar noted, Valdivia's main objective during 
these trying days was food and the accumulation of grain, 'because he feared 
hunger more than work and war'.44 
The situation of misery created by the Indians backfired. While the Spaniards 
used all their past experience to create a rudimentary economic system that 
permitted their physical survival, the Indians witnessed the rapid deterioration 
of their own strength and the sudden collapse of their military capability. By 
implementing economic war at the precise time that additional resources were 
needed to maintain large contingents of warriors to defend the pukaraes, forts 
and palisades, the Indians made a grave error. 'During the period of intensive 
war', wrote Marino de Lobera, 'the Indians were not free from these sacrifices, 
because besides the hunger that they suffered, they also saw how they 
diminished owing to the war and hardships.'45 The sudden military defeat of 
the Picunches and Promaucaes in the summer of 1545, precipitated though it 
was by the Spaniards, was the culmination of a long process of resistance that 
was weakened by their own decision to destroy most of their material resources. 
The Flight of the Warriors 
'When they realised that the confrontation was total, and seeing 
that they had started something that they could not abandon 
without losing their lives, many of them left their lands.' 
Geronimo de Vivar, Cronica y relation copiosa y verdadera de 
los reinos de Chile (1588), p. 64 
The impact of the war of raids and pillage and the increasing scarcity of 
resources forced the Picunches and Promaucaes to abandon their lands. This 
eventually paved the way for the collapse of tribal society in Central Chile. It 
is true that the migration secured the survival of several thousand men who 
sought refuge and settled on the southern banks of the Maule river, but it also 
demolished any hope of military victory over the Europeans. Lacking a social 
structure that could materially sustain the military effort and without the warriors 
to defend their settlements, the defeat and submission of the last Picunches and 
Promaucaes became inevitable. 
Several authors have described the flight of the warriors, identifying two 
successive migrating waves. Sergio Villalobos has dated it at about 1543-1544, 
observing that the Indians 'fled to isolated lands, cut off by mountains and snow, 
away from the plains dominated by the cavalry. But put to the test of hunger 
and the sword, they had to bow and come down to serve the invaders'46 This 
interpretation of events is based on contemporary testimonies such as that left 
by the veteran soldier Santiago de Azocar. Describing the military expeditions 
sent out to the Indian lands after September 1541, Azocar pointed out that the 
soldiers 'found the food in the fields, and the Indians fled from their villages 
and were absent for some days; after some two or three months, Valdivia sent 
his soldiers and people to raid their lands and to call them to make peace; then 
the Indians came to promise their obedience, and most of the people of the land 
were at peace with us, with the exception of two from the valley of Aconcagua 
and Chile, who remained stubbornly rebellious'.47 
According to several other testimonies, it seems that the first sudden flight to 
the mountains was followed by a more systematic migration to the south and 
perhaps across the Andes. Vivar wrote that not only did the Promaucaes 
abandon their lands, but once they had settled in the new country they called the 
Indians of Mapocho who had stayed behind to come and join them. 'The 
Promaucaes sent their messengers to the Indians of the country [Santiago] who 
were serving us. These Indians had no alternative but to serve us because they 
lived too close to our city and had their settlement in flat lands. The Promaucaes 
invited them to abandon Mapocho and to settle among them; they told these 
Indians that there were enough lands to harvest and to settle; that they should 
no longer serve us and that the Promaucaes would give them their lands 
willingly. The Promaucaes had reasoned that if nobody worked for us, we would 
be forced to leave the country. In their opinion, the Spaniards had stayed only 
because the Indians of Mapocho had served and helped to build our houses and 
fields.'48 
Apparently, the long term military objective pursued by the Promaucaes was 
to establish a military alliance with the northern Picunche groups and to build 
a fortified frontier on the southern bank of the Maipo river. To this end, on 
several occasions messengers were sent to the north to parley with the rebels led 
by Michimalonko and his allies. In September 1541, Valdivia marched to 
Cachapoal led by two captured Promaucae caciques who were promoting 
support for this enterprise. The Promaucaes failed to achieve their military 
alliance with the Picunches, but once the Spaniards crossed the river Maipo they 
found that the migration had been very significant. Thus, the lands and fields of 
Santiago were almost empty and the encomiendas were depopulated. Above all, 
the flight of the Promaucaes and the northern Picunches benefited the Indians 
of Maule who saw their warring armies swollen by veterans of the war of 
Santiago. Eighty years later, Rosales pointed out that the Araucanians had 
become more arrogant and powerful, 'because they were joined by the 
Promocaes, with their women and children, who fled their old country, to avoid 
the rigour of Spanish arms'.49 
The massive migration of the original inhabitants of Santiago and the 
neighbouring districts had few parallels in the continent and caused alarm among 
the conquistadores. Spanish expansionism did not consist in the annexation of 
lands but in the submission of people and their exploitation as cheap labour. 
Immediately after the destruction of Santiago, when the Indians abandoned their 
settlements, Valdivia sent several parties to the country 'to call the rebel natives 
to peace and to encourage them to remain settled in their houses'.50 Captain 
Rodrigo de Quiroga pointed out that, as leader of some of these parties, his 
soldiers 'found the food burnt in the fields and the villages depopulated'.51 
Pedro Gomez don Benito wrote that in the course of these expeditions, the 
Spaniards found 'the Indian villages without people because they had abandoned 
them'.52 Despite their strenuous efforts to halt the Picunche wave the Spaniards 
ended up with lands that were barren and desolate. 
The virtual depopulation of Santiago became clearer when Valdivia decided 
to create the first encomiendas. It was at this hour of the distribution of the 
spoils of war that the Europeans could fully appreciate its devastating effect and 
the scale of the flight of the natives. During the Cabildo Abierto which took 
place in Santiago in 1542 to distribute the Indians in sixty encomiendas, 
Valdivia stated publicly to his soldiers that he had 'no clear idea of all the 
caciques settled in the land, [but] that he wanted to reward them on behalf of 
His Majesty, and that if he was not able to give them as he wished and wanted 
and they deserved, it was because the whole country was at war and very few 
wanted to serve publicly'.53 
The exodus of the Picunches was not limited to Santiago and Maipo. Once 
the Spaniards extended their control to the province of Maule and then began 
to penetrate the southern lands, a second migration of Picunches and Promaucaes 
took place. In a title of encomienda granted by Valdivia to Hernando de Huelva 
in July 1552, the governor highlighted the recent movements of people in the 
southern regions and the uncertainties that surrounded the creation of new 
encomiendas. The document stated that the encomienda granted to Huelva 
included 'the lebos of Otogue, Coigueco, Pelel, Viegana and Chilean, with their 
appointed caciques Reynoguellan, Tipaxququen, Millamiral, Painelen, Catarongo, 
Gunachaco, Paivelerma, Guanamangua, Guelen, Basracheuque, Languaguano, 
Molovaveen, Tarnelo, Tarnande, Aneprelan, Caromande, Calmacheuque and all 
the other caciques and those who are not principals, plus all the Indians and 
subjects of the caciques hereby named, and those who are absent [our 
emphasis], insofar as they are subjects and belong to the jurisdiction of the said 
lebos, who have their seat near Itata river and this city of Conception, in order 
that you should be served by all of them'.54 As had happened in Mapocho, by 
the time the first encomiendas in Maule were created, only the skeleton of a 
dismantled social system existed there. Institutionally, some cacicazgos still 
persisted but the majority of the Indians were absent or lived in such disorder 
{behetrias) that their affiliation to a particular group was in doubt. 
The massive migration of warriors varied regionally, but it affected all the 
tribal segments settled in Central Chile. The valleys, formerly occupied by the 
colourful and picturesque settlements of the Promaucaes and Picunches, became 
a waste land. Yet the fields they abandoned were some of the best in the 
country, irrigated and terraced, close to woods and rivers and well protected by 
the hillforts in the neighbouring mountains; they enjoyed relatively mild weather 
and had easy access to the Andean foothills. This had facilitated the 
development of a pastoral economy with an endless supply of rich grazing and 
seasonal pasturage. The Spaniards, who up to 1544 had been restricted within 
the walls of the city, recognised the good quality of the land and proceeded to 
reallocate the empty fields to Indian allies who, for unstated reasons, found 
themselves landless. In fact, entire communities were re-settled in the lands left 
behind by the fleeing Promaucaes and Picunches. This is what happened to the 
lands of Vuilquisa, on the northern banks of the river Maipo, which had 
belonged to cacique Ellocaudi; they were given by Valdivia to cacique 
Alongomanico on the pretext that they were 'at present not populated'.55 In 
1553 the Cabildo of Santiago agreed to give to Juan Jufre the lands positioned 
'in the valley that runs through the middle to the Tagua-Taguas . . . that valley 
and land is not settled'.56 It is worth mentioning that the pukaraes of Tagua 
Tagua were the last military strongholds of Promaucae and Picunche resistance, 
and that between 1541 and 1544 the area had witnessed a large concentration 
of migrants from the north. The final thrust of Valdivia and his men did 
accomplish the annexation of the lands between the Maipo and Maule rivers, but 
most of the area was deserted. 
The flight to the south had enormous social consequences for the survival of 
tribal society in Central Chile but it was not the most dramatic reaction to 
European invasion. While the great majority of the original inhabitants fled, 
others simply accepted their fate and committed suicide. While this behaviour 
was common in other regions of the continent, it generally took place among the 
Indians when they experienced the abuse and exploitation of the encomenderos. 
In Central Chile the natives took the path of death before the war of conquest 
finished. The soldier Lope de Ayala wrote in this respect: 'the Indians spent a 
long time without working the fields and let themselves starve'.57 Garci Diaz 
de Castro pointed out: 'we suffered great hardships and starvation, because the 
Indians rebelled and were at war against the service of His Majesty. They 
thought they could throw us out of their lands by halting their work and 
allowing themselves to suffer'.58 The same picture was painted by Juan de 
Almonacid who wrote that 'the Indians of the country allowed themselves to die 
and stopped their sowing for more than three years'.59 Vivar, whose account 
of these early days is rather moderate in tone, pointed out that from 1541 the 
Indians 'preferred to lose their lives rather than serve the Christians'.60 
In 1559 the Licenciado Hernando de Santillan corroborated the observations 
made by the soldiers during his visit to the districts of Santiago and La Serena, 
noting that during the course of his visita he had endeavoured to communicate 
to the Indians 'that the will of His Majesty was that they should be preserved, 
a fact that had never been communicated to them, rather they have been treated 
like enemies. For this reason they were desperate. I found through 
communications with religious people that the Indian mothers had refused to 
breastfeed their infants but preferred to kill them, saying that that was better 
than to wait until they were seven or eight and were taken away by the 
encomenderos to work in the mines, never to be seen again.'61 
Death, hunger and massive displacement eroded the body of society and 
weakened Picunche and Promaucae resistance. Bearing in mind that their 
numerical superiority could still incline the military balance in favour of the 
natives, the loss of the warriors and their families accelerated the end of the war 
for the control of Santiago and the neighbouring districts. Yet there still 
remained the hope that the fleeing tribal clans could recover their strength in the 
free lands of Araucania or Itata and return to the north in order to liberate the 
lands of their ancestors. For those Indians who stayed behind, the end of the war 
marked the beginning of servitude and extinction. 
The Demographic Collapse 
The end of Promaucae and Picunche resistance was also accelerated by the rapid 
demographic collapse experienced by tribal society. The factors behind this 
collapse included the exodus to the south, forced recruitment as auxiliaries by 
the Spaniards, and the deaths caused by the battles of Santiago. 
Contemporary sources do not describe plagues or epidemics which may have 
decimated the Indian population. Only in 1549 is there a reference in the 
minutes of the Cabildo of Santiago indicating the presence of carache: 'it is 
acquired by cattle, horses and mares . . . and some Indians'.62 Vivar described 
an epidemic of typhus and a severe drought which affected the Araucanian lands 
between 1554 and 1557, exterminating at least two thirds of its population, but 
there is no reference to a similar impact in Central Chile.63 One can only 
speculate that if there was such a disaster in the region, it took place through 
contact with the northern tribes before the arrival of the Spaniards. 
It is difficult to evaluate in demographic terms the impact of the war and the 
flight to the south. According to modern calculations, the original population of 
the Central Valley in 1540 was 130,000.M In 1594, almost half a century later, 
the Indian population has been calculated at 20,000.65 According to Jorge 
Hidalgo, the warriors who crossed the Maule river fleeing from the Europeans 
numbered up to 25,000 fighting men and their families. 
The forced resettlement of Indians or their incorporation into the imperial 
army left some evidence of the numbers involved. Vivar observed that in 
September 1541 the curaka Quilicanta offered 400 men to Valdivia in his 
campaign against the pukara of Michimalonko: 'Apo, use these Yndians who are 
well prepared for fighting, because they are very bellicose and good warriors, 
they come from the valley of Mapocho.'66 Whether these men of Mapocho 
were specialised soldiers or not, their number was rather small. References to 
massive movements of Picunches and Promaucaes in the expeditions to 
Araucania are scarce and the numbers of auxiliares involved are also 
insignificant. Gongora Marmolejo observed that one of the survivors of the 
disaster of Tucapel in 1554 was 'a principal and lord of the valley of Chile in 
Santiago, whose name was Don Alonso and who served Valdivia, one who 
could speak Spanish and who showed plenty of common sense'.67 During the 
same battle, observed Marino de Lobera, the Europeans counted on the support 
of a 'good number of Indians brought by Valdivia from the subjected villages; 
their captain was the famed Michimalongo, who had been the leader of the 
rebels before this land was conquered'.68 
In 1546 the townspeople of Santiago presented a petition to Valdivia in which 
they described the magnitude of the demographic collapse caused by the war. 
'We know that there are few Indians, either because when we entered this land 
there were not so many as it was said, or because the few who were there have 
died in great quantities from the great wars that have taken place in the conquest 
and subjection of this land.'69 Then they added: 'the encomiendas have very 
few Indians, at most one hundred or fifty and some only thirty'. At a ratio of a 
maximum of 150 male Indians per encomienda (a very optimistic estimate 
considering the numbers quoted), the total population of Central Chile in 1546 
was no more than 25,000, including women and children. 
The picture of demographic desolation painted by the vecinos for the early 
days of the conquest was contradicted by other witnesses. Vivar affirmed that 
the collapse of the Indian population was caused first by the war of conquest 
and then by the hard labour imposed upon the Indians in the mines and 
agricultural fields. 'There are not as many people in this land now as there were 
when the Spaniards entered this country, because of the wars and rebellions the 
Indians raised against us. This was a reason for their decrease, that from three 
parts there is now only one left. The mines have also been a cause; one 
combined with the other contributed to their destruction.'70 Whatever the causes 
of their diminution, the reduced number of Indians observed a few years later 
was a grim balance of the conquest. 
The sharp fall in the number of Indians available for service in the 
encomiendas and mitas forced Valdivia to reduce the original total of 60 
encomiendas granted in 1542 to just 32 in 1544. Vivar described this change as 
follows: 'The General realised that there were too many vecinos in the city and 
that the Indians were few, and that it was too much for the latter to be 
distributed among 60 vecinos\ he decided for the well-being of the natives to 
reduce the number and ordered the formation of only thirty encomiendas.'71 
Gongora Marmolejo wrote that a few weeks later Valdivia marched to Itata 
'when he realised that within the limits of Santiago there were not enough 
Indians to reward his soldiers'.72 Valdivia himself, in a letter to Carlos V 
written in 1550, pointed out that only in 1544 had he fully realised that Indians 
were scarce: 'conquering the land md consolidating peace, I had a truthful 
account and saw that the number of people was small'.73 
According to a decree published in 1546, the governor was even forced to 
include absent Indians in the new encomiendas. The decree specified that 'of 
sixty vecinos who had Indians within a territory of 35 leagues long by 12 or 13 
across, which are the limits of this city, they have been reduced to thirty-two; 
besides the Indians of the said jurisdiction, they have been granted twelve or 
thirteen caciques who are settled on that side of Itata river'.74 In another 
instance of redistribution of encomiendas, Valdivia made it clear that the reason 
that moved him to grant additional Indians to his soldiers was the fact that the 
soldiers could not sustain themselves with the few Indians left in their service. 
In the title conceded to Marcos Veas granting cacique Vichato and half of the 
natives of Lampa, Valdivia wrote: [I do it] 'because you have very few Indians 
in your service'.75 The encomienda of Juan Godinez on the banks of the river 
Maipo decreased from forty Indians granted in 1542 to just twenty, two decades 
later.76 
The Spanish soldiers depended on the possession of Indians to recover the 
expenses incurred during the wars of conquest. Therefore, the restructuring of 
the encomiendas and the reallocation of the natives carried out by the governor 
greatly benefited a few soldiers but it also caused resentment and was the cause 
of legal disputes. In 1548, during the trial organised against him by his 
'enemies' in Lima, Valdivia justified his actions by arguing that 'the land was 
so deprived of Indians that after a visit we found no more than twelve thousand 
Indians and there were caciques who had no more than three hundred'.77 
Valdivia put forward a similar argument in a letter to the Emperor stating that 
the first encomiendas had been allocated 'without proper information, because 
it was necessary to placate the temper of the soldiers'.78 
In 1549 the rapid extinction of Picunches and Promaucaes caused conflicts 
between the encomenderos of Santiago and the leaders of the expedition 
organised to conquer Bio-bio. The attorney of the Cabildo, Pedro de Miranda 
demanded that Valdivia should take notice of the representations made by the 
encomenderos to stop Indian males draining away to the south: 'because Indians 
are so scarce in this country, he should neither consent nor allow soldiers or 
others to take away any pieza . . . nor should the Indians used to carry burdens 
be taken beyond the Itata river, but should be able to return to their fields to 
take care of their subsistence; if His Lordship should decide otherwise, this land 
would be lost and depopulated'.79 
The visible signs of the profound changes that tribal society in Central Chile 
was undergoing under the European invasion ranged from economic crisis and 
the flight to the south, to the demographic collapse of Promaucaes and 
Picunches. Each of these events reflected the rapid destruction of the social 
system which, in the past, had made possible successful war against the Incas 
and against the soldiers led by Almagro. 'Whatever were the factors that caused 
the disintegration of native society', Sergio Villalobos wrote recently, 'the 
outcome was the same. The life of the villages was disorganised, families lost 
their cohesion, men and women left each other for different destinations, 
children were left semi-abandoned. Many men became members of a transient 
population in which laziness and crime occupied most of their time. The 
disintegration was not only social but also moral.'80 
The testimony left by the Spanish soldiers does not provide enough evidence 
to assess the psychological reaction of the Indians to the disaster inflicted by 
imperial expansionism. A few references do show that suicide, alcoholism and 
social alienation were considered by many as the best escape from the world of 
desolation in which they had to live. Unlike the stubborn soldiers led by 
Valdivia the inhabitants of Central Chile had not chosen their fate. It was 
imposed upon them. 
The Policy of Abuse and Theft 
'There were cattle when we entered this land, but not very many. 
As a result of the wars numbers have been depleted. Now there 
are none left. This is because wherever the Spaniards go, 
especially in their conquests, they are like locusts on bread.' 
Geronimo de Vivar, Cronica y relation copiosa y verdadera de 
los reinos de Chile (1588), p. 186 
'They set dogs on them, and others were burnt and tortured, and 
their women and daughters were taken away. They were chained 
and burdened. Their houses and villages were devastated by fire, 
their fields destroyed. Because of this the Indians became sick 
and large numbers died of cold and hunger and as a result of 
feeding on wild plants and roots.' 
'Relation de lo que el licenciado Fernando de Santillan, oidor de 
la Audiencia de Lima, proveyo para el buen gobierno, 
pacification y defensa del reino de Chile, 4 de Junio de 1559', 
Coleccion de documentos ineditos para la historia de Chile desde 
el viaje de Magallanes hasta la batalla de Maipo (Santiago, 
1888), vol. 28, p. 284. 
The end of the war did not mark the end of sufferings and sacrifices. The war 
of conquest in Central Chile was followed by the introduction of imperial 
control over the conquered people. This process, especially the appropriation of 
the land, meant the forced displacement of the original inhabitants, destruction 
and death. 
The formation of landed properties in rural Chile took place after the 
introduction of the encomiendas and only after the Indians had been militarily 
defeated. In this context, the Spaniards saw that it was in their interest to clarify 
the links of affiliation that existed between the Indians and their respective 
groups and settlements. The future appropriation of their lands by the 
encomenderos depended on this. 
However, in the circumstances of social disorder and chaos that prevailed 
after 1541, it was not easy to re-constitute the old lineages and tribal segments. 
A method that facilitated the early transfer of lands was the displacement of the 
original owners either to the mines or the town, or simply to lands vacated by 
other Indians; in this way, large tracts of farmlands, grazing lands and woods 
were made available to the encomenderos. A title of lands granted by the Town 
Council of Santiago to Joan de Cabrera in 1547 indicated that the lands given 
were situated 'in a valley called Bombancagua, where there used to be a village 
of guanaqueros'.81 The same day the Council gave lands to Diego Oro 'in the 
fields that used to belong to cacique Apochame, where there was a village of the 
said cacique\ A year before, the Town Council took possession of the pastures 
that belonged to chief Guaraguara, pointing out that the act of possession 
included 'all the lands as they are and [that] used to belong to the said 
cacique'In similar terms, Governor Valdivia offered in 1552 'the waters and 
fields where there used to be an Indian town and which is now abandoned'.83 
It is important to note that in at least two of the cases quoted, the Spanish 
authorities had some knowledge of the previous owners; if they had fled during 
the war, and before the arrival of the soldiers, then it is unlikely that the names 
of caciques would have been mentioned in the grants; therefore, it is more 
probable that the transfer of lands took place after the war and was parallel with 
the expulsion of the natives. 
The mechanics of the transfer of lands were rather simple. Firstly, the Indians 
were identified with or ascribed to a particular group and settlement; then they 
were given in encomienda to a Spaniard. Once distributed, they were forced to 
work in the mines in the north or in the fields neighbouring the city. At this 
point, their lands fell into disuse and began to look abandoned, forcing their 
transfer. It is likely that the Indians were returned to their settlements to work 
the fields now owned by their encomendero. 
A similar process of appropriation of lands took place south of Santiago. In 
1549, the Cabildo granted itself the monopoly exploitation of woods situated 'in 
all the lands that belonged to cacique Millacaza, in Maipo and the banks from 
the mountains to the sea'.84 In another title granted to Juan Gomez in Cailloa 
it was noted that the lands 'used to belong to Quinellanga'.85 
Once the Spaniards had consolidated their hold of the Central Valley, the 
soldiers openly demanded ownership of the lands occupied by the Indians of 
their encomiendas. In 1553 Juan Cuevas asked the Cabildo to grant him 'the 
town called Ranguelpaico, that belongs to cacique Leumoulen'.86 Pedro de 
Miranda, Pedro de Gomez and Alonso de Cordoba, all of them veterans of the 
war against Picunches and Promaucaes, demanded the lands of caciques 
Huechuraba, Cachapoal and Talagante respectively. 
This process of appropriation was obstructed by the confusion regarding the 
true affiliation of the Indians. The land-measurer Gines de Lillo presented 
interesting testimonies concerning a lawsuit between the encomenderos of Colina 
and Lampa, during which they called upon the Indian elders to testify to the 
legitimate right of each group to occupy the fields in the valley of Liray. These 
fields, pointed out an Indian called Quinalpangue, 'have always been known to 
belong to the Indians and caciques of the said village of Colina where they have 
lived and had their cattle. The Indians of Lampa have never trespassed on the 
borders I have described, neither have they ever had any quarrel about it with 
those of Colina.'87 Another Indian witness asserted that the lands of Liray 
'belong to the Indians and town of Colina, who have always sowed the land and 
lived there with their cattle. For this reason the Indians of Lampa have never 
occupied these fields because they do not belong to them'. Paradoxically, 
although the testimonies of the old Indian men confirmed the exclusive use of 
the lands by the people of Colina, they were recorded to legitimise the exclusive 
right of the encomendero to exploit the fields of Liray. 
The pressure to obtain lands that the Spanish soldiers exerted on the 
authorities had to be balanced against the right of the Indians to natural justice. 
The combination of both created conflicts. In 1547 the Cabildo discussed the 
allocation to Pedro de Villagran of 'an estancia for pasture and labour by the 
banks of the river Maipo, in the lands of Guachinpilla, cacique of Marcos 
Veas'.88 After a long discussion, the lands were granted to Veas. To justify 
their decision, the members of the Cabildo said that if they had done otherwise 
it would have been 'in prejudice of the natives'. 
The paternalist mentality inspired both by practical reasons and by the need 
to restore the Indian labour force was not constant. Only twenty years later, in 
1577, Chile witnessed fierce and bitter polemics between encomenderos and 
clerics, sparked off by the abuse and over-exploitation of the natives. Pedro 
Sarmiento de Gamboa observed in his Visita: 'it is our experience that by having 
the encomenderos in their power and administration the said Indians are abused 
and have diminished and have died in large numbers from the excessive work 
they have been put under; for this reason I order that all the vecinos 
encomenderos should not publicly nor secretly nor by third persons enter the 
villages of their Indians, neither should they use them in their service unless 
they have direct authorisation from me'.89 
The demographic decline caused by migration and war worsened once the 
Indians were distributed in encomiendas. The worst instruments of destruction 
were the forced displacement of the natives, work as servants in the towns and 
the over-exploitation that took place in the mines and farms. This was so in the 
case of the Indians granted in 1542 to Antonio de Tarabajano. Tarabajano 
accused Governor Valdivia of nepotism and denounced the misery caused to the 
natives led by caciques Aloande, Tunapande y Maquindoande, original 
inhabitants of Mapocho, after his encomienda was granted to Francisco de 
Aguirre. 'At the time I was dispossessed of them, the said Indians were rich, 
well settled and could be counted in great numbers; I ask you if you know that 
now, owing to ill treatment and because the said captain Francisco de Aguirre 
has taken them away to use them as servants, and has moved them to live with 
him to extract gold in the city of La Serena, the said caciques and Indians are 
lost, dispersed and dead.'90 Francisco de Villagra confirmed the accusations 
made by Tarabajano, pointing out that 'at present the said cacique Aloande and 
his Indians are dissipated and are fewer than they used to be, reduced by more 
than half'. A similar situation took place in Rapel and Topocalma, where the 
encomienda granted to Juan Gomez was withdrawn by Garcia Hurtado de 
Mendoza 'because the said Juan Gomez has decimated and destroyed the said 
Indians'.91 
The forced re-settlement of the Indians began after the defeat of the pukara 
of Michimalonko in Aconcagua. On that occasion, at least 600 Indians were sent 
to work in the mines of Marga Marga. This was the first mita ever established 
by the Spaniards in Central Chile and became afterwards a regular event, with 
a constant flow of men and women duty-bound to the mines. Marino de Lobera 
observed that one of the encomenderos who contributed regularly to the mita 
was Rodrigo de Quiroga, who sent a quota of 600 natives to work in Marga 
Marga: 'This was imitated by the other encomenderos with great loss to the 
bodies and souls of the wretched Indians.'92 The experience and skills gained 
by these Indians in the mines transformed them into valuable assets for the 
future development of mining in other conquered regions. According to Gongora 
Marmolejo, the initial stages in the exploitation of the gold mines of Angol, in 
Araucanfa, were carried out by 'yanaconas withdrawn from the mines of 
Santiago'.93 
Another cause of Indian destruction was their removal to satisfy the economic 
needs of the encomenderos. Valdivia recognised this irregularity and the severe 
effects that previous decisions had had on the natives of Lampa in the title of 
encomienda granted to Hernando de Gallego. The title established that the 
encomienda consisted of 'half of the said valley of Lampa and half of the 
caciques and principals, Indians and subjects of the said valley, wherever the 
said Indians may be now, bearing in mind that I have decreed their removal 
from the valley of Chile'.94 Not least destructive was the allocation of several 
physically scattered Indian lineages to a single encomendero. Juan de Cuevas, 
for instance, had in encomienda the followers of caciques Andegauleu, 
Guamizalvi and Ibimalongo of Santiago, Huechuraba of Mapocho valley, 
Curiomilla and Longomilla of Maule, Guarongo, Macohuano, Arongomanique 
and Gatuyavi of southern Maule and the Promaucaes Curanaval and Paniarongo. 
In these cases the dispersion of the Indians and the need to extract maximum 
profit from their labour encouraged their removal to the most productive farms 
or to the cities to work as servants. Nothing is said in the documents about the 
conflicts of Indians from different clans and tribes, in most cases sworn enemies, 
being forcibly mixed by their masters, but it is likely that murder by poisoning 
was a common feature in the new 'settlements' created by the Europeans. 
These mechanisms of destruction of tribal society operated within the violent 
environment created by the conquest. The Spaniards occupied the richest farm 
lands, destroyed the woods and exhausted the traditional sources of hunting and 
gathering; the war they waged against the natives interrupted their migration to 
the mountain slopes and dramatically halted inter-ethnic trade. Amid these 
extraordinary and sudden changes, the chances of survival for the local 
population became more remote. The Picunches and Promaucaes who survived 
the horrors of the war and forced displacement had to learn new skills and 
forego their ancestral techniques and ways of relating to the environment; 
equally traumatic were the new burdens of acculturisation and ideological 
conversion and their absorption into a highly repressive social and religious 
system. Finally, the Indian women had to suffer the sexual demands of the 
Europeans and bear their mixed-blood offspring. Although these were the more 
subtle ways of exploiting the vanquished they were as dramatic and perhaps 
even more destructive than work in the mines and labour as servants. 
Meanwhile, the new duties to the imperial state and to their encomenderos 
restricted the Indians to the exploitation of their nearest plots of lands, woods 
and fields; the days when they could combine several ecological niches in the 
course of their enterprise were gone. They had neither access to their ancestral 
fields in far-away districts nor men to carry out these tasks. The tribal economic 
system was contracting, more lands were being vacated and greater opportunities 
were thus created for Spanish and mestizo encroachment. 
Survival for the Picunches and Promaucaes was synonomous with poverty and 
hunger, deprivation and pain. Condemned to live in the impoverished lands 
allocated by the new authorities, the Indians of Santiago saw the Castilian 
horseman galloping through the beautiful valleys and ravines of the old land; his 
flag was a symbol of extermination and death. 
It was difficult for the Spaniards to accept that they were the real cause of so 
much terror and so many premature deaths. In their minds, the Indians 
themselves were responsible for their fate either because they had resisted the 
imposition of imperial rule or simply because they were inherently wicked. 
Valdivia stated this view in no ambiguous terms when he appointed Juan Lopez 
as Alcalde of the mines of Marga Marga. Valdivia instructed Lopez to exert his 
authority with zeal: 4You know that the Indians are liars and only wish to 
escape, not because they are ill treated or because they are subjected to hard 
labour in the gold mines, nor because they lack food or supplies, but because 
they are bellacos [wicked] and badly disposed in everything.'95 
The Picunches and Promaucaes protested against their masters by either 
escaping or refusing to work. In those instances of rebellion Valdivia himself 
headed military squads to smother the last sparks of resistance. During the early 
years of the city, Vivar wrote, the governor spent his time 'pacifying the 
country, because there were some caciques who refused to serve their masters 
and as soon as he knew of any rebel, the general visited his settlement at dawn 
with thirty riders and gave the necesary punishment, and forced him to serve. 
He did this with diligence and promptness where appropriate and most 
convenient.'96 
The repression of the rebels was at times combined with indiscriminate 
punishment in order to maintain order and discipline throughout the conquered 
lands. The main reason for this arbitrary and intimidating policy was the 
development of the Araucanian war in the south, which threatened several times 
to spill over into Central Chile, and the renewed upheavals of the northern 
tribes. Although the battles for the control of Santiago had concluded by 1545, 
the war for the conquest of the country had only begun. In 1549, with the 
emergence of a rebel front in Copiapo and Coquimbo, the Spaniards imprisoned 
the main caciques of Chili and Mapocho. At the same time, Juan Gomez was 
authorised to 'arrest any Indians from any repartimiento, whether at peace or 
war, and to torture and to burn them to obtain information about their intentions. 
He [Gomez] would neither be held responsible now nor in the future would he 
have to account for his actions because this is required in the service of God 
Our Lord and the wellbeing of this land.'97 
The Re-Making of Tribal Society 
Spanish expansionism in the New World rested upon the desire of the 
conquerors to extend the frontiers of the empire at their own financial cost, and 
depended upon the rapid capture of new land, wealth and human resources 
which would allow the crown to reward these private efforts. 
In Chile, Valdivia and his comrades showed from the early days of their 
enterprise that they were determined not only to incorporate America's southern 
territories into the Spanish crown but that they also intended to settle 
permanently in the new kingdom. However, the destruction and collapse of tribal 
society threatened the plans of the Europeans. On the one hand, their 
expectations of feudal service could not be satisfied because of the shortage of 
Indians. On the other, the scarcity of economic resources obstructed the 
accumulation of private fortunes that could be invested to finance imperial 
expansionism into Araucania. 
During the early days of the Spanish conquest, the presence of a vast army 
of Indian labourers that could cultivate the land and work the mines was crucial 
for the development and consolidation of the new colonies and towns. Their 
availability determined the creation of any surplus and was essential for the 
development of any future expansionist enterprise. In Chile, the threat of 
extinction of the Picunches and Promaucaes boded the end of the enterprise, 
unless Valdivia and his men were able to raise funds and men in Peru or Spain. 
The Indians of Central Chile, after so many years of war, hunger and misery, 
could hardly satisfy the expectations of feudal service built up by the conquerors 
between 1540 and 1545. The gold and copper mines, agricultural works and 
cattle-raising farms had to wait until the Indians had recovered from their 
miserable state. If in the rest of the continent the mitas and encomiendas became 
operational as soon as the Indians were distributed among the Spanish soldiers, 
in Chile the integration of the tribal segments to the new social and economic 
structures was a much slower process. The weakness and poverty in which the 
Indians found themselves at the end of the war left the Spaniards with no other 
option. Alternatively, intensified exploitation of the few Indians left would have 
simply quickened the pace of their extinction, thus compromising the future of 
the colony itself. 
Despite past hatred and rivalries, the Spaniards needed their old enemies. A 
dead Indian had no value for encomenderos, governor or crown. To establish a 
profitable system of exploitation, the Spaniards in Central Chile had first to help 
their future servants to survive. This was well understood by Valdivia and his 
followers. As Marino de Lobera pointed out, once the war against the cacicazgo 
of Michimalonko had concluded and the war against the Promaucaes began, the 
governor 'began to put in order the work of the land and communicated to the 
Indians their duties through servicio personal, instructing them to cultivate the 
land immediately, so that they could supply the Spaniards abundantly'.98 The 
old spirit of confrontation was replaced by pragmatism. 
Once the natives of Mapocho and Aconcagua had been defeated and the 
expansion to Maule had begun, the Spaniards proceeded to create an 
environment of peaceful coexistence with the Picunche and Promaucae tribal 
segments who had stayed in Central Chile. Aware that their own physical 
survival depended on the continuing presence of Indians in the conquered 
valleys, the European soldiers rapidly occupied the lands between Mapocho and 
Maule, recognised the authority of the lonkos and promoted the material and 
social recovery of native society. If the policy of war had brought destruction, 
the new policy of domination and control was designed to bring peace and 
stability to the Indians. 
While they were still fighting against the Promaucaes, the Spaniards moved 
swiftly to Maule to halt the flight of the warriors and thus stop the drain of 
people to the south. In July or August 1541, only six months after the 
foundation of Santiago, Valdivia sent Captain Pedro Gomez to explore the lands 
situated south of the Maipo river. This first expedition was exploratory, but soon 
after its return the Spaniards set forth towards Maule and established a garrison 
in the unconquered lands. Pedro de Villagran, commander of the new fort in the 
neighbourhood of the river Maule, wrote in his Information de Servicios in 
1562: 'To put order in the conquest, pacification and consolidation of the city 
of Santiago and its districts, the said Governor Pedro de Valdivia gave 
instructions to build and we built a fort on the river Maule, which is situated 
thirty-five leagues from Santiago, so that a frontier garrison with a captain and 
soldiers could be established. They were [instructed] to carry on the conquest 
from there with greater comfort because that was the most convenient place to 
do so; it was the stronghold of the whole country.'99 Francisco Ponce de Leon 
described in his statement the military operations carried out under the 
leadership of Villagran: '[He] suffered and had great and excessive burdens 
because he and his companions had to fight continuously, destroying forts and 
pucaraes [sic] that the Indians built and erected against them, etc.'100 
The strategic importance of the Maule fort was considerable. It was from 
there that an expedition led by Villagran reached the banks of the Bio-bio river 
and explored the rich lands controlled by the Indian lords of Andalien and 
Reinoguelen. On his return to Maule and after informing the governor, Villagran 
and his men were moved 'to the Province of Apalta, which is sixteen leagues 
from Santiago . . . he held that garrison for a long time, carrying out from there, 
as elsewhere, many sorties against the Indians, having many battles and 
skirmishes with them'.101 
The military campaigns fought by Villagran against the Promaucaes were 
followed by the final march undertaken by Valdivia in 1544 against the 
strongholds of Tagua Tagua. According to Vivar, when the Europeans entered 
the provincia of the Promaucaes 'all the people of war went to the other side of 
the river Maule. Having seen this, the General [Valdivia] rode through the land 
and province of the Pormocaes [sic]. He reached the river Maule, working with 
those Indians who stayed behind and those he found in their towns, telling them 
not to go and not to be afraid, but that they should serve, and that no evil or 
damage against them was intended; he told them to pass on the message to other 
Indians, that they should come back to their lands and re-build their houses and 
sow the land.'102 
Despite the efforts made by Valdivia to halt the drain of people to the south, 
the migrational flow of the Promaucaes did not cease. Facing disaster, the 
governor sent Francisco de Villagra to 'the province of Arauco, by land . . . to 
gather information and to push the Indians who belonged to these lands back to 
us'.103 By the beginning of April, Francisco de Aguirre was left among the 
Promaucaes 'with stores and provisions in an Indian town because, being there, 
the Indians could not return to their villages to live in peace unless they were 
prepared to serve'.104 This statement, included in a letter from Valdivia to the 
Emperor, reflected the serious burden faced by the governor who, under pressure 
from his men, had to provide Indians for servicio personal out of an ever 
smaller native population. 
The mere presence of a Spanish fort among the Promaucaes and the 
permanent deployment of cavalry columns were not enough to stop the wave of 
migrating exiles to Araucanfa. In September 1545, Valdivia instructed Francisco 
de Aguirre to march with twenty men 'to the southern banks of the river Maule, 
which is situated thirty miles away from this city of Santiago, to build there a 
fort and to ride the lands bearing in mind three reasons: the first, that if the 
Promaucaes intended to escape in order not to serve there would be someone to 
punish them; that if they found any Indians, they should force them to return to 
their lands to work for their caciques; thus, everybody will benefit. Finally, 
because the Maule Indians, seeing all this and having their lands raided by the 
Spaniards, would not allow the Promaucaes to settle in their province, and thus 
they will decide to submit themselves and give obedience to us.'105 
Spanish expansionism into Araucania was brought to a halt by the need to 
stabilise the fragile structure of Indian society and the strategic plan to 
consolidate their control over the territories of Central Chile. After 1545, the 
main priority was to help the recovery of the Picunches and Promaucaes and to 
stop the flight of the defeated warriors. In his letter to Madrid, Valdivia wrote, 
after his campaign against the Promaucaes, 'I have a captain with men in the 
province of Itata in order to stop them from going back there'.106 In another 
communication, Valdivia pointed out that he had put Francisco de Aguirre in 
charge of the garrison at Itata: 'He doesn't allow the Indians from here to cross 
to the other side, and if the Maules welcome them [the fugitives], he punishes 
them.'107 
The deployment of troops to the Maule region and the attempts made by the 
Europeans to stop the migration of Picunches and Promaucaes to the south were 
part of a wider strategy implemented by Valdivia and his captains to restore 
some degree of normality to the territories conquered south of Santiago. The 
Spaniards did not ignore the magnitude of the crisis affecting the natives and 
fully realised that mere repression would not achieve the desired results. 
Despite the shocking picture of desolation and misery in Central Chile left by 
chroniclers and witnesses, it is evident that the flight of the Indians was not 
total. Modern historians are right when they state that the road to the south was 
taken mainly by young warriors and their women, and that children, mature men 
and the old and infirm stayed behind in the lands of their ancestors. These social 
groups bore the brunt of the war, became the first serfs of the Europeans and 
witnessed the transformation of the Spanish soldiers into masters of men. They 
also witnessed the metamorphosis suffered by the new rulers who began to 
dispense support and care towards those who were previously their enemies. The 
task of the King's representatives as they tried to reconstruct tribal society under 
the umbrella of the new Hispanic institutions was certainly formidable. 
The survival of the Europeans in Central Chile, as in the rest of the continent, 
depended largely on the early establishment of cooperative ties with the local 
Indian leadership. Thus, Valdivia tried to maintain a relationship based on 
collaboration with the tribal segments of Mapocho and Aconcagua even during 
the worst moments of war. His efforts to create a friendly network of allied 
lonkos and friendly caciques were facilitated by the persistent internal disputes 
and internecine warfare among the aborigines. In fact, the first parley celebrated 
in Santiago in the summer of 1541, attended by the Inca Quilicanta, the lonko 
Atepudo and eleven other chiefs, was used by the Indians of Mapocho to forge 
an alliance with the newcomers to fight against their enemies of Aconcagua. 
When Michimalonko was defeated in 1541, the governor avoided the total 
humiliation of the lonko by accepting his promises to give obedience and remain 
at peace. According to the testimonies, the pukara of Aconcagua was left intact, 
no hostages were taken and the power and prestige of Michimalonko, perhaps 
one of the most powerful chieftains of Central Chile, remained relatively 
untouched. 
The outbreak of a second military campaign in Aconcagua, initiated by the 
burning of a Spanish vessel in Quintero, led to the capture and imprisonment of 
the main caciques of the area. Their removal to the Spanish fort of Santiago was 
followed by the formation of a widespread Indian alliance which incorporated 
Incas, Diaguitas, Picunches and Promaucaes; their target was the destruction of 
the Spanish garrison. During the decisive battle of Santiago, on 11 September 
1541, the Indian warriors sought to liberate their leaders from prison. This action 
reinforced the status and authority of the old lonkos and caciques in the eyes of 
their followers. 
Nevertheless, the murder of the captured prisoners by the besieged soldiers 
put in jeopardy Valdivia's plans to keep the tribal leadership in place. As soon 
as the battle was over, Valdivia sent several columns to the neighbouring lands, 
urging the Indians to remain settled and at peace. After the second campaign 
against the Promaucaes, Valdivia and his men marched for the third time against 
Aconcagua, and captured lonko Tanjalonko, lord of the lower half of the 
Aconcagua valley. 'When the captured cacique Tanjalongo [sic] was presented 
to the General, he [Valdivia] ordered his feet to be cut off. They did not kill 
him, as his crimes demanded, because he was a powerful cacique. His word was 
respected and he would attract support for peace with the same strength as he 
was able to incite to war many other caciques and Indians.'108 
The defeat of Tanjalonko eliminated the leadership of the coastal tribal 
segments, but Valdivia persisted in his efforts to transform lonkos into effective 
agents of the new system of domination and control. According to Vivar, 
General Rodrigo de Quiroga returned to Santiago 'and brought with him some 
Indians and principales, who were sent by the governors as messengers . . . to 
those who had run away in order to persuade them to return to their homes'.109 
A similar tactic was used during the war against cacique Cachapoal, when the 
Spanish column headed by Valdivia included two Promaucae chiefs 'to negotiate 
peace with them'.110 
The prolonged Indian resistance to the invaders caused the disintegration of 
the main cacicazgos of Central Chile. Furthermore, from 1542 Valdivia changed 
his policy and decided to remove the last remnants of the old tribal leadership. 
Thus, after the fierce battle of the pukara of Angostura, the governor 'hanged 
some principales and Indians and did the same outside the fortress, so that the 
others would see and would come to serve by their own will and would stay in 
peace; they would realise that [this] would be healthier and of greater profit to 
them'.111 
The political vacuum caused by the absence of a formal tribal leadership was 
worsened by the growth of leaderless social segments and the rise, on other 
occasions, of two or more chiefs. Traditionally, some of the tribes of Central 
Chile had developed a dual system of leadership similar to the political 
structures of the northern Andes, but since 1541 the political system 
disintegrated as the caciques fled their lands and other men took over the role 
of the traditional chiefs. Throughout the Central Valley the Indian villages 
witnessed the rise of new leaders appointed by the Spaniards. 
Thus, in less than a decade, the ancient system of distribution and recognition 
of political and military power within tribal society suffered a substantial 
transformation. On the one hand, the traditional mechanisms to generate political 
power were destroyed by the fragmentation of the tribes and the scattering of the 
lineages; on the other hand, the Spaniards emerged as an outside power, always 
ready to recognise and legitimise the new caciques. In truth, the Spaniards had 
no practical alternative but to recognise the new chiefs because the distribution 
of Indians for the encomiendas depended to a large extent on the ability of 
native leaders to name their followers. Obviously, the difficult task of gathering 
together the widely scattered social segments was greatly facilitated by the 
intervention of these new leaders. Not least important was the revival of the 
Indian chiefs as natural mediators between the crown, its representatives and the 
Indian population. 
Bearing in mind their need to stabilise Indian society, to ascertain the size of 
each parcialidad and to establish with greater clarity the links of dependence 
and loyalty between families, lineages and clans, the Spaniards readily 
recognised the authority claimed by the new lonkos. This was shown when 
Valdivia integrated into one single deposito the followers of caciques 
Palloquierbico, Topocalma and Gualauquen 'with all their subjects, prencipales 
[sic] and Indians, who are in the provincia de los poromaucaes [sic], by the 
coast. Along with prencipales Arcanaval, Rutaucony, Arongo Milla, 
Quienchogare, and all their Indians, who were formerly subject to cacique 
Lilongomoro in this valley of Mapocho.'112 Two years later, Valdivia renewed 
the grant of the caciques mentioned adding 'the prencipales Huminelgas and 
Calmalongo and Guanunabal, who fled many days ago from the lands of 
Palloquilica, and are now settled in that region of Maule'.113 
Explaining his policy of reorganisation of the old cacicazgos, the governor 
wrote in his letter to the Emperor in 1545: '[I] took from the caciques to give 
each [Spaniard] some people for his service; and the accounts I had were of 
(great) quantities of Indians from Mapocho valley to Mauli; I had many names 
of caciques. They have never served, because the Inca did not conquer beyond 
these lands, and they are barbarians; everybody was named as principalejo; each 
of them had 20 or 30 Indians and so I gave them in encomiendas after the war 
finished and I went to visit them.'114 
To avoid disputes between the encomenderos over the right to recruit Indians 
belonging to two or more chiefs, Valdivia made it clear to Captain Gomez that 
the Indians granted for his service were 'all the Indians of the said prencipales, 
whether they are subject to them or to other [chiefs]'. In the same document, the 
governor established that if any lonko wanted to bring more people to the 
encomienda granted to Gomez, 'it is my will, on behalf of His Majesty, that you 
should have no right to the chief or his Indians, because I have ordered that they 
be taken away from him [the cacique]' Valdivia, moved by the desire to 
generate new cacicazgos, broke up larger social units by recognising new lonkos, 
and thus he divided the Promaucae tribe led by Marucalagua and Guandopuche. 
In his grant of Indians to Captain Diego Garcia Villalon the governor separated 
'cacique Guandolcalqui with all his principales Indians and their followers'.116 
In some cases, the intervention of the conquerors led to the formation of new 
tribal segments. This was the case in the distribution of the Promaucaes led by 
cacique Guandolcalqui, who saw his following enlarged with the Indians of 
caciques Quinvaulibi and Colicoli 'with all their principales and Indians, who 
are settled among them [Guandocalqui's people], and cacique Quelangari with 
his town Cauquin, with all his Indians, who are in this provincia de Mapocho, 
on the other side of Maipo'.117 In 1548 the governor confirmed the successful 
integration of the Promaucaes in a new title of encomienda', there he stated that 
the encomienda consisted of caciques 'Guandopuche, and Guandocolque and 
Colicoli with their principales, towns and Indians . . . one thousand two hundred 
Indians'.118 A year before, Valdivia created an encomienda with the followers 
of cacique Tipitureo, incorporating 4cacique V i t apand i . . . if the said Vitapandi 
happens to be subject to cacique Tipitureo'. In 1549 the Spanish authorities 
applied a similar method in the creation of the encomienda granted to Juan 
Jufre. On that occasion it was stated that the encomienda would incorporate the 
followers of caciques Malti and Tocalevi 'with all the Indians and prencipales 
who are settled on the hills of this valley of Mapocho, and who used to be 
subject to cacique Longomarico'.119 A few years later, Valdivia enlarged this 
encomienda by integrating the Indians of caciques Inviralongo, Pelquitarongo, 
Antiguano and Vandeguano 'who are settled in the valley of Mapocho and 
belonged to cacique Longomoro'.120 The governor also added caciques 
Aloande, Quipandi, Niticura, Quilicura and Andequina, 'with all their Indians 
and principales and subjects, as they were under the orders of cacique 
Chiguarua, who are settled in the said provincia de los Promocaes'.121 
In another encomienda, granted to Captain Francisco de Aguirre in 1549, 
Valdivia included among the original inhabitants the followers of caciques 
Aloande, Tipande, Niticara, Quintecara and Andequina 'with all their Indians 
and principales and subjects, as they were under the rule of cacique Agamba, 
who are all settled in the provincias de los Promocaes\m Diego de Velasco 
received in similar circumstances the encomienda integrated by caciques 
'Perimalongo, Tongui, Catalandi, with all their Indians, principales and subjects, 
who are settled in the valley of Mapocho and who belonged to cacique 
Villacura'. 
The main objective of the policy implemented by Valdivia of integrating 
different cacicazgos was to make the encomiendas economically viable and 
operational; he also sought to define the ties of loyalty between Indians and their 
disorganised lineages and clans and, not least important, to obtain a clear picture 
of the number of followers claimed by each cacique. Indirectly, however, the 
Spanish governor, by legitimising the claims of the new lonkos and by 
establishing new tribal segments, was interfering in the internal political affairs 
of the Indians. The impact of this policy could not be ignored. Potentially, it 
sowed the seeds for tribal warfare as there was always a possibility of a clash 
between the new leaders, legitimised by the Spaniards, and the lonkos and 
warriors who migrated to the south. It has to be borne in mind that Valdivia and 
his men were operating during the 1540s in lands and against men who had not 
been definitively defeated, and that large sections of the Picunche and 
Promaucae tribes were preparing to reconquer their lost lands and to recover 
their right to rule. Internal disputes and internecine wars, which had been 
common in the region before the arrival of the invaders, were rife during the 
years of Inca rule. These also occurred during the war of resistance against the 
Spaniards and there was no reason to believe that they had disappeared forever. 
However, regardless of the dangers inherent in the creation of the cacicazgos 
and the rise of new lonkos, Valdivia in 1546 issued a decree aimed at 
consolidating his 'restructuring' policy. In his decree, the governor formally 
recognised all the new cacicazgos and declared that the Indians were 'free of 
any obligation to other caciques, in order that they should serve with the Indians 
of their [new] masters'.123 
The new lonkos did not always replace the caciques who had fled. In 1553 
Juan Fernandez attended a meeting of the Cabildo of Santiago with some 
Promaucae chiefs; among the Indians was cacique Querepanto who described 
himself as subject to cacique Guarquincheo. The latter, it was noted in the 
minutes, 'was now in charge of the Indians of [cacique] Gurgey, deceased'.124 
Furthermore, the replacement of lonkos was not universal. The cacicazgo in 
Aconcagua led by Michimalonko and Tanjalonko remained untouched for at 
least two decades. So it appears in a memorial presented to the authorities in 
1560 asking for an encomienda of 'the caciques principales of the said 
repartimiento, one called Michimalongo, with all his principales and Indians, 
and the other parcialidad led by cacique principal Guatelmilla, heir of 
Guandocongo, with all his principales'.125 It is probable that Valdivia reached 
a military alliance with Michimalonko and Tanjalonko that helped to maintain 
them in their position of power and preserved their following. They had already 
reached a similar agreement with the Incas in the past and, more than probably, 
did so with the conquistador. Similarly, the cacicazgo may have been preserved 
by the fact that both tribal segments were granted in encomienda to a single 
individual, the cleric Rodrigo Gonzalez. Nevertheless, regardless of the reason, 
the continued existence of the cacicazgo of Aconcagua as one single entity was 
rather the exception than the rule. 
The effort made by Valdivia to recognise the new caciques was a 
consequence of both political and military considerations. Politically, the rise of 
new caciques fragmented the tribes and made possible the grant of smaller 
encomiendas to his soldiers. Thus, although the grants contained fewer Indians, 
they relieved the pressure from disgruntled soldiers. Militarily, the legitimisation 
of new lonkos created further divisions among the natives, weakened their power 
and consolidated the role of the Europeans as 'king-makers' and masters of men. 
Socially, the reconstituted cacicazgos, smaller in size and restricted to smaller 
territories, made the recovery of tribal society more feasible. 
The new caciques were exempted from personal service and the mitas. 
Besides their traditional role as headmen and advisers, the caciques began to 
play an active part as mediators between the mass of the Indians and their new 
masters, reproducing to some extent the system of social and political control 
imposed by the Incas in the region. The new chiefs received resources and 
provisions from the Europeans that they could distribute among the starving 
Indians, forging ties of dependency and loyalty. The survival of the new system 
of coexistence with the Europeans was largely beneficial to the new leaders who 
sought to bring political and social stability to the region. The balance for the 
Spaniards was positive, as the new lonkos facilitated the incorporation of the 
remaining tribal segments into the new society and contributed to their survival. 
Nevertheless, the artificial reconstruction of tribal political leadership was a 
perilous path to follow; it was done at the cost of dividing some cacicazgos into 
smaller, perhaps non-viable social units, and in the face of the danger of the 
violent return of the old caciques from the south. The seeds were sown for the 
development of new internecine disputes, this time between the leaders 
acknowledged by the Spaniards and the traditional chiefs. 
The efforts made by the Europeans to reconstruct Indian political leadership 
were accompanied by a parallel policy designed to give lands to the new 
cacicazgos which had been displaced from their traditional territories. The 
displacement of the Indians to work in the mines and obrajes, the suspension of 
their traditional economic activities and the flight to the south, reduced tribal 
society in Central Chile to a calamitous state. This social disaster was 
aggravated by the forceful take-over of their lands during the war and the new 
demands for lands brought about by the rise of the new tribal segments. This led 
to several applications for lands by Indians who found themselves destitute at 
the end of the war. In 1552 the Indians granted in encomienda to Captain Pedro 
Gomez presented one such application to the Cabildo demanding the return 'of 
certain lands that belonged to them, or [to be given] other lands for their 
subsistence; they stated that their lands were taken away to settle Spaniards'.126 
To relieve the misery brought about by their actions and to accelerate the 
social and economic recovery of the natives, the new authorities proceeded to 
give lands to the displaced Indians. In 1550, the Cabildo instructed Captains 
Juan Gomez and Pedro de Miranda to visit the lands of 'Quintililica, within the 
jurisdiction of this city, so that in the name of God and their conscience they 
should give and distribute lands among the Indians of the said Captain Field 
Marshall Pedro de Villagran, without damage to the Indians of Alonso de 
Escobar, a citizen of this city, or any other Indians'.127 The same year, the 
Cabildo designated two magistrates to 'give lands to the Indians of the said 
Pedro Gomez, without prejudice to the caciques and Indians granted to 
Bartolome Flores'.128 In their instructions to the magistrates, the members of 
the Cabildo pointed out that they should make 'physical deposit' of the new 
lands, establishing their limits very clearly, 'so that they can have and own 
them'. In 1552, the Cabildo was forced to consider the allocation of lands to the 
people led by cacique Martin, of Mapocho, who had been granted in 
encomienda to Juan Jufre and whose lands had been distributed among the 
conquerors in 1541. In the first instance, the Cabildo agreed to grant the lands 
occupied at that moment by Martin and his followers 'without damage to the 
Indians'. However, in the event that the land proved to be insufficient, they were 
to be given the lands of 'Poangui, and lands of cacique Talagante, and other 
vacant lands that were and could be idle'.129 Nevertheless, it was not necessary 
to take over the lands of Puangue or Talagante. Eventually, Martin and his 
followers were settled 'in a town near the river Maipo, which is called the seat 
of Maipo, that used to be a mitimaes of the Inga [sic] and is now empty'.130 
This was not the only time that the availability of lands vacated by the 
mitimaes helped to satisfy the need for lands among the aboriginals. In 1553, the 
Cabildo granted lands to the followers of cacique Guelenguala 'by the said 
channel that used to belong to the Inga mitimaes'. Like Martin, Guelenguala and 
his followers had their lands distributed among the Europeans. Reflecting the 
scarcity of good lands in the region, the title of property granted by the Cabildo 
specified that the distribution and allocation of the new fields to Guelenguala 
had to be carried out taking care that 'the neighbouring Indians do not 
suffer'.131 The officers in charge of giving the lands were instructed to perform 
their duty in such a manner that 'the Indians should have those lands as their 
own, for now and forever; because the said Indians were deprived of their lands 
to found this city'.132 
The demand for space to settle the landless Indians was greater than the lands 
available for distribution. This forced the authorities to break down territories 
that belonged to one single cacicazgo or to compel some lineages to share their 
resources with newcomers. The latter was the case in the grant of lands given 
to the Indians of the encomienda of Juan Cuevas, who were to be settled in the 
lands of cacique Leumaulen, 'without great damage to the said Leumaulen, 
although the lands belong to him, because the said Leumaulen confirmed in this 
Cabildo that he does not need the said lands'.133 Perhaps a similar mechanism 
allowed the resettlement of the encomienda of Pedro Gomez in Quimamba, 
whose people were installed in the territories situated between the Indians of the 
encomiendas of Bartolome Flores and Pedro Gomez in the neighbourhood of Rio 
Claro. 
The re-making of tribal society included not only the distribution of lands but 
also the delivery of seeds and grains to the Indians, whose stocks had been 
depleted or destroyed by the conquistadores. Valdivia pointed out in a letter to 
Hernando de Pizarro in 1545 that 'the Indians are now so exhausted [by the 
war], that they want to stop; they want to come and serve us; so they have 
cultivated the lands again and they have been given wheat and maize to plant 
and to harvest for their own subsistence'.134 Vivar corroborated this, stating 
that the governor 'visited the land personally, encouraging the Indians who were 
subjected to settle in their lands and to make large fields of maize and 
wheat'.135 Juan Gomez observed some years later that the Indians had directly 
benefited from the farms kept by the Spaniards in Santiago during the worst 
years of the war. According to Gomez, during those years the Indians fed 
themselves 'with wild herbs and other things from the countryside, but it did not 
stop them gathering in fortresses in the provincias de los Promocaes, leaving 
behind their lands and environment. If the Spaniards had not cultivated their 
fields, it would have caused great damage and they would not have survived; 
and this also helped the Indians who later came in peace, because it was a great 
help and prevented them from starving. They fed from the fields of the 
Spaniards.'136 Pedro Miranda, one of the witnesses presented by Gomez, 
pointed out that because the Indians had resisted for a long period of time 
without working the lands, 'after they had agreed peace the farms [of the 
Spaniards] were crucial, for them not to starve, because they were supplied and 
provided'. Once the Indians had surrendered, wrote the cleric Rodrigo Gonzalez, 
the Europeans supported them with food, preventing 'their starvation and making 
possible their reproduction'.137 
The support given to the Indians took place while the policy of abuse, theft 
and ill treatment still afflicted the inhabitants of Central Chile. The Spaniard was 
still a greedy soldier, embarked on the hazardous enterprise of getting rich 
quickly, but he also was the master of men, responsible for the well-being of 
those left in his charge. The contradictory co-existence of these two processes 
made life for the Indians even more confusing and unbearable. It is true that the 
latest actions of the Europeans reflected a greater understanding of the 
conditions of misery and hopelessness in which the natives found themselves 
after the war - an understanding that was probably inspired by a genuine 
charitable attitude or perhaps by the increasing social exchanges they developed 
with the natives - but it cannot be ignored that owing to the private and 
capitalistic character of the enterprise of conquest, it was in their interest to 
avoid the extinction of the aborigines. The authorities could not ignore that the 
Indians were actually the prize, together with lands and patents of nobility, 
which the crown could dispense to reward the efforts of the private soldiers. 
Imperial expansionism was meaningless if it took place in empty lands. In the 
new feudal environment that emerged on the periphery of the empire, the 
absence of servants deprived the soldiers of the crown of one of the main 
incentives to migrate to the New World. As was well known, for the European 
nobles and peasants who crossed the Atlantic social power and status could only 
be acquired from the control they could exert over other men. America could not 
be the golden land if it was barren and empty. 
The efforts made by the Spaniards to reconstruct tribal society in Central 
Chile during the 1540s had not achieved the desired results by the end of the 
decade. In the early 1550s the Promaucaes and their allies still lived in disorder 
and anarchy. Social disintegration, vagabundaje, indiscipline and generalised 
anomy disrupted the productivity of the encomiendas and prevented the better 
use of the scarce material and human resources available in the region. 
Moreover, tribal disorder was still the cause of dangerous 'arguments and 
passions' among the Spaniards of the small colony. The focus of these 
differences was the confusion created by the ambiguous affiliation of the Indians 
to the encomiendas, 'because too many caciques and principales and men and 
women go wandering away from the control of their caciques'.138 
To re-establish a certain degree of normality in the cacicazgos, the Cabildo 
instructed Captain Jufre to visit the Indian settlements and villages of Santiago 
and the surrounding areas and to carry out an enquiry 'to gather information, 
rationally and without much alteration, and to return the Indians to whom they 
belong'. Jufre carried out his visita during 1551 and presented his report to the 
Cabildo in the following year. In his presentation, the veteran captain pointed 
out that he had managed to return the Indians 'to whom they in each case 
belong', but that there were still some encomenderos who complained 'about 
aggravation they suffer because their Indians had run away from their villages 
and caciques'.139 
The relative success achieved by Jufre was followed at the end of 1552 by 
a new commission, this time ordered by governor Valdivia, to carry out a 
similar visita among the Promaucaes. In his decree, the governor described the 
situation of social disorder prevalent among the Indians and the serious threat 
it represented against continued imperial control in the region. Because of its 
quality it is here quoted in full: 'Because the caciques, principales and Indians 
who are granted in encomiendas among the townspeople of this city of Santiago 
still persist in living like animals, fleeing their towns and seeking refuge among 
others, in alien lands, causing great inconveniences to the said townspeople 
because they cannot use what belongs to them; for this reason there is need to 
appoint a mature and experienced captain who can take care of this work and 
who should be able to order each Indian to go to serve his master in his town 
and leave those foreign villages where they are in hiding and living like 
escapees. In case they refuse these just and reasonable orders, he [the captain] 
is authorised to harass and to punish them for disobeying the orders that they 
have been given, ordering them to be clubbed or to have their limbs cut off, to 
be burnt or hanged, and any other punishment that he should consider 
convenient and just . . . [You are given these instructions] so that you will be 
able to put order and reason in respect of the caciques prencipales and Indians 
who are encomendados to the townspeople of this city and its districts and 
jurisdiction, and so that you will be able to order them to go back to their 
villages to serve their masters. You will be able to punish them without making 
a written statement in front of a notary, but on your word only, because it is 
convenient that way, as they live in their villages in utter barbarism; you will not 
incur any responsibility for these punishments or for the shedding of blood that 
you may order of one or more Indians; and in order that you may carry out your 
commission with prudence and moderation I call upon your conscience, so that 
like a knight you should use the least rigour possible . . . because you are aware 
of the love I feel for these Indians.'140 
The extraordinary instructions given by Valdivia to his captain which sought 
to re-establish 'normal' social relations among the Indians of Central Chile 
reflected a desperate state of mind. However, in the context of the events that 
had shocked the region since 1541, the drastic measures adopted by the governor 
seemed to have been the only realistic method of bringing back tribal society 
from the very brink of total collapse. In other words, the magnitude of the 
catastrophe that affected the natives demanded severe action, otherwise the last 
echelons of aboriginal society would soon disappear. Only a week later, Valdivia 
reiterated his instructions to Jufre, widening his powers so that he would be able 
to put down the rising number of internal disputes and alleged sorcery among 
the Indians. 'As you are aware,' wrote Valdivia to Jufre, 'among the Indians 
who are distributed among the townspeople of this city there is too much 
barbarism, they kill each other with hambi, bad herbs and sorcery, and although 
they have for this been harassed and punished, they persevere in their mistakes. 
The authorities of this city will appoint somebody to deal with this, and because 
you are going to visit the villages of the caciques, to make sure that the Indians 
who belong to one [village] should not flee to other villages, I give you my 
commission so that you can also put a stop to this.'141 
The selection of Jufre to carry out such a sensitive task was not arbitrary. 
Jufre was one of the most distinguished soldiers of the conquest and had become 
a powerful encomendero among the Promaucaes. Under his charge were the 
cacicazgos of Tipitureo, Guaquilla, Tipandi, Arongoante, Millanabal, Quidetuy, 
Calquimarongo, Catearongo, Curipillan and Nancoande. Describing his tasks, 
Jufre left in his Probanza a detailed, although short, account of the work he 
carried out on behalf of Valdivia to restore social order among the Promaucaes: 
'I gathered them in towns and made them sow the lands and store provisions for 
one year and brought them to live in peace, teaching them to become men again. 
In all this I spent a long time and underwent great sacrifices, because the said 
Indians were barbarian people and they used to go about naked and lacked 
order, justice and public life, but now they enjoy tranquility and are rich.'142 
Diego Diaz declared in the same document that the deeds carried out by Jufre 
were of some magnitude 'because by that time the Indians of the provincias de 
los Promocaes were wild people who lived without any order'. 
Whether Jufre was as successful as he claimed is difficult to ascertain for lack 
of additional evidence. A year later, Valdivia was still dealing with the problem 
caused by the unclear affiliation of the Indians to the cacicazgos and their 
constant movement among the villages. This, added to the rapid demographic 
deterioration of the Indian population, was once again creating disputes among 
the encomenderos. Valdivia's new decree, issued in 1553, introduced new 
methods to pursue claims about missing Indians. He justified his new rules 
stating :'Because the said townspeople have begun to move too many lawsuits 
and arguments about the Indians that have been granted to them, which is a 
great disservice to God and His Majesty; because this may bring about greater 
scandals and disturbances to his vassals; because the said Indians could be ill-
treated, distracted, removed and displaced from their homes and natural 
environments; because in the name of the King I need, to keep my conscience 
clear and to benefit the realm, to provide a cure before this disease grows; 
because this is a wild country, and the Indians do not recognise their own 
caciques, and there are too many principales with Indians, who allege that they 
belong to one cacique at the beginning and then we find that they do not, [this 
instruction to be kept] until we have greater knowledge of their uses and 
customs, their way of life and submission.'143 
Perhaps the greatest significance of this decree is that it was issued so many 
years after the conquest of Central Chile, in an epoch when the initial disorder 
and anarchy caused by the war could well have been a thing of the past. More 
than anything else, it shows that the magnitude of the destruction of tribal 
society was greater than has been accepted up to now, and that the recovery of 
the Indians was a far more complex process. 
By the time lonko Lautaro and his warriors crossed the Bio-bio to liberate the 
lands of the legendary Picunches and Promaucaes, the re-making of tribal 
society was well underway, a fact that Lautaro and his Araucanian allies ignored 
in their strategy. It is true that they were well received by some of the surviving 
tribal segments, but even those natives who welcomed them as liberators had 
already lived under European subjection and adopted some of their way of life. 
Thus, many Indians were more ready to betray the warring lonkos and their 
warriors than to fight for their own freedom. A pure tribal society, as may have 
been dreamt of by those in exile, no longer existed. This determined from its 
very beginning the outcome of the last war for Central Chile and decided the 
ultimate defeat of its inhabitants. 
The End of an Era 
By the beginning of the 1550s tribal society in Central Chile was militarily 
defeated, economically ruined and socially broken. The Picunches and 
Promaucaes had by then become the barbarians described by the Inca and 
Spanish chroniclers. The flight to the south and east, the forced re-settlement of 
large ethnic groups and the need to adjust their lifestyle to the new norms 
introduced by the invaders broke down the old social system and destroyed the 
mechanisms of cohesion which had previously bound the tribal lineages. Each 
man and his extended family had to develop his own strategy for survival while 
the traditional ties of solidarity and support weakened; fractionalism replaced the 
military co-operation and combined political action that had flourished in the 
previous decades. The calls for a renewed war issued by the Promaucaes did not 
find echo in Santiago, wrote Vivar, 'because these Indians preferred to serve the 
Spaniards in order to enjoy their lands and their country rather than be hunted 
down and killed with their women and children'.144 The war of the zupais and 
the long days of repression that followed had left a heavy mark on the 
vanquished. Meanwhile, the new caciques lacked legitimacy and vision. The 
final hour for the Picunches and Promaucaes had arrived. 
As elsewhere in the continent, several legal sanctions were introduced in 
Chile to soften the impact of imperial rule and individual abuse. More than 
anything else they helped to create an environment of concern in which the fate 
of the natives was not completely ignored, but the effect of the restrictive 
legislation was mainly formal and co-existed with abuse and terror. In other 
words, the influence of Catholicism and the impact of the argument in defence 
of the natural rights of the Indians were not enough to transform the system of 
oppression and servitude introduced in the New World. The system itself had 
been established to answer material needs and to reward generously the financial 
investments and personal sacrifices made by the soldiers in the expansion of the 
frontier of the empire. Respect for the oppressed and overworked Indians had 
no place in a society based on the submission of men; tribal society, on the 
other hand, could not operate alongside a system based on the imperative of 
rapid accumulation of capital to finance new expansionist enterprises. 
Nevertheless, in Central Chile the Spaniards had enough reasons to halt the 
extinction of the natives. Firstly, it was obvious to the Europeans that their own 
survival depended greatly on the presence and availability of a large army of 
labourers and military allies who could maintain and defend the new towns; 
Santiago de la Nueva Extremadura was physically cut off from Peru and Spain 
and the contingent of European soldiers was too small to be able to carry on the 
war and also work the fields. Secondly, the first clashes with the fierce and 
resourceful Araucanian warriors in the south had shown that imperial rule had 
to be consolidated north of the river Bio-bio. It certainly implied a tighter 
system of control over the surviving Picunches and Promaucaes, but the new 
social system had to be imbued with pragmatism and inspired by greater charity 
in order to be firmly rooted in the new lands. 
The conquistadores had won the war but they had to survive among and with 
the vanquished. Therefore, as soon as the war of the pukaraes was over and 
Central Chile was under their control, the Spaniards faced a more challenging 
and almost impossible task: the reconstruction of tribal society and the practical 
subjection of the Indian to the crown. 
In the early stages, as reviewed in the previous pages, the re-making of Indian 
society was carried out by giving lands, food and seeds to the starved Indians 
and then by recognising their leaders. Whether that was enough to achieve 
strategic targets is a question that goes beyond the remit of this paper, but 
suffice it to say that by the end of the 1550s a new wave of rebellions indicated 
that some recovery had taken place and that the Indians could once again resist 
their oppressors and fight for their freedom. 
Promaucae and Picunche society in Central Chile collapsed under the military 
thrust of the European invaders but the speed and magnitude of this disaster was 
largely determined by the Indians themselves, who chose the wrong tactics and 
fought the war with a mistaken perception of the new enemy led by Valdivia. 
The arrogant lonkos and their warriors, who had stopped the Incas and defeated 
Almagro, realised their miscalculation and marched to exile in Araucania, while 
the rest of the natives had to work in the mines and the encomiendas. The 
territories controlled by sehorios led by Michimalonko, Tanjalonko, Vitacura, 
Lonkomilla and so many other caciques became the new province of Nueva 
Extremadura. 
In servitude, few Indians survived the hardship, humiliation and ill-treatment 
inflicted by the Europeans, but those who did became the labour force and 
cannon fodder that sustained the Spaniards and made possible their expansion 
to Araucania. The pukaraes, symbols of past power and independence, were left 
empty on the mountain-tops as mute witnesses of an era of epic wars that would 
have no equal in the history of Central Chile. 

Encomiendas of Central Chile 
Pedro de Valdivia 
Gonzalo de los Rios 
Ines de Suarez 
Juan de Cuevas 
Juan Jufre 





Rodrigo de Araya 
Gabriel de la Cruz 
Pedro Gomez don Benito 
Diego Garcia Caceres 
Rodrigo de Quiroga 
Alonso de Silva 
Francisco de Riberos 
Clerigo Rodrigo Gonzalez 
Antonio de Taravajano 
Alonso de Cordoba 
Alonso de Escobar 
Marcos Veas 
Esperanza de Rueda 
Francisco de Irarrazabal 
Francisco Martinez 
Juan de Barros 
Juan Gomez de Almagro 
Pedro de Miranda 
Juan Bautista Pastene 
Pedro Ordonez 
Quillota, Lampa 
Putaendo, La Ligua, Papudo 
Colchagua, Peumo, Teno, Melipilla, 
Apoquindo 
Huechuraba, Curaumilla, Vichuquen, Lonkomilla, 
Huenchullani 
Nunoa, Macul, Peteroa, Copequen, Mataquito, 




Talagante, Cauquenes, Putagan 
Cuyo 
El Salto, Cachapoal 
Lampa 
Lora y Quilicura 
Huechuraba, Guechun, Llopeo, Apalta, Aculeo 
Peumo, Teno, Colchagua, Melipilla, Apoquindo 
Gonza 
Aconcagua, Panquehue, Llai-Llai, Malloa, 
Peteroa 
Cacicazgo of Michimalonko 
Promaucaes 
Vitacura, Pirque, Rancagua 
Nancagua, Chimbarongo 
Lampa, Maipo 
Lampa, Tobalaba, Tango, Ligueimo 
Quillota 
Colina, Chicureo, Painalbique, Chacabuco 





Caciques and Indian villages in Central Chile 
Year 
Cacique Tribe/Village mentioned 
Michimalongo, Tanjalongo Valley of Chile 1541 
Chingaimangue Valley of Chile 1541 
Aloande, Turiopande, Maquindoande Santiago 1541 
Painelonko Lampa 1541 
Quilacanta Indio del Peru 1541 
Longomilla Maipo 1541 
Caloande (or Moyande, Aloyande 
or Aloande) Promaucaes 1542 
Topocalma, Gualauquen Promaucaes (coast) 1544 
Arcanaval, Rutaucory (Rutancomi), 
Arongomilla, Quiechongare (previously 
subject to cacique Cilongomoro 
or Atongomoro) Mapocho Valley 1544 
Marucalagua, Guandopuche, 
Guandolcalqui Promaucaes 1544 
Painavillu Promaucaes 1544 
Perimalongo, Tongui, Catalandi 
(previously subject to Villacura) Mapocho Valley 1544 
Tipitureo Rio Guelenguelevano, 
Promaucaes 1544 
Andegauleu, Guamizalvi, Ibimalongo (?) 1544 
Cachapoal, Elisoca Promaucaes, Maipo 1545 
Quinvaulibi, Colicoli Promaucaes 1545 
Quelangari Cauquin, south bank of 
Maipo river 1545 
Llangallave Promaucaes (?) 1545 
Guaraguara east of Santiago 1546 
Guanunabal (subject to Palloquilica) fled to Maule 1546 
Inlagorongo Cerrillos de Apochame, 
Santiago 1547 
Guachinpilla banks of the Maipo 1547 
Tariopande, Neaquidoande, Naamachese Promaucaes 1548 
Condatongo, Anguaguay, Parapuchi Mapocho Valley 1549 
Querogalguen, Paynavillo, Llavelenco, 
Guaguinpangue, Guaquey, Mareande 
(previously subject to Aloande) Promaucaes 1549 
Hernando banks of the Maipo 1549 
Malti, Tocalevi 
(previously subject to Longomarico) Mapocho Valley 1549 
Guaquilla, Tipandi Promaucaes 1549 
Cacique Tribe/Village Year 
Arongoante, Millanabal, Calquimarongo, 
Catearongo, Quidetuy Promaucaes 1549 
Inviralongo, Perlquitalongo, Antegueno, 
Landaguano Santiago 1549 
Tipande, Niticara, Quintecara, Andequina 
(previously subject to Agamba) Promaucaes 1549 
Millacaza Maipo 1549 
Quinellanga, Itinguillanga Cailloa (between rivers 
Cachapoal and Tinguiririca)1549 
Maluenpangue Taguataguas 1549 
Joan Darongo (Guandarongo) between rivers Mapocho 
and Maipo 1549 
Antequilica, Chumayo, Catanlagua Picones of Poangui 1550 
Palloquierbico (Palloquilica),Huminelgas, 
Calmalongo, Millanabal, Purinabal Promaucaes 1550 
Tabon, Culimailen Rapel -
Catiputo (?) -
Vicelongo, successor to Longomoro Mapocho 1551 
Umbarango Mapocho 1551 
Atumapante, Andequina Promaucaes 1551 
Vandeguano 
(previously subject to Longomoro) Mapocho 1551 
Aloande, Quipande, Niticura, Quilicura, 
Andequina Promaucaes 1551 
Victiolo, Longopilla, Guahunpilla Lampa (?) 1552 
Catarongo, Parapolin Tobalaba 1552 
Quirogalguen, Nimaogalguen Vitacura 1552 
Painabillo, Lonquie Ruydabal (Santiago) 1552 
Conelquenau, Malopangue Llangan (Santiago) 1552 
Isache, Guarquincheo, Arrequey Curguey Quelerima (Santiago) 1552 
Arcapeo, Guayqueande Peteroa (Santiago) 1552 
Morangallo, Morongarita, Canavas, 
Millalonique, Imporongo Mapocho 1552 
Capelande between rivers Maule and Itata 
Inviralongo, Pelquitarongo, Antiguano, 
Guachuraba Mapocho 1552 
Curiomilla, Longomilla banks of the Maule 1552 
Guarongo, Macohuano, Arongomanique, 
Gatuyavi Maule 1552 
Curanaval, Paniarongo Promaucaes 1552 
Annmaulen Ranguelpaico 1553 
Source: CDIHCh (see fn. 12) and Coleccion de historiadores de Chile y 




























Arabic word meaning 'wall of stones'; 'wall of 
dry-stone'. 
Quechua word meaning Lord, Father, Master. 
Indian warriors in the service of the Spanish army. 
Town Council. 
An emergency Town Council meeting augmented with 
selected citizens. 
Social segment composed of several lineages under the 
leadership of a powerful cacique. 
Indo-american word meaning headman, leader, head of 
extended family. 
Mapuche word meaning skin rash. 
Small farms located near the Spanish cities. 
Mapuche word meaning warrior, soldier. 
Spanish soldiers. 
Quechua word meaning crown representative of the Inca. 
Spanish word referring to Indians who had been retained by 
the crown and were then given temporarily to a Spaniard. 
Grant of Indians, especially as tribute payers. 
Holder of an encomienda. 
Large estate or ranch. 
Guanaco (Andean camelids) shepherds. 
Evidence presented by individuals to the crown to support 
demands for promotion or titles. 
Informal Mapuche administrative division containing nine 
smaller cavies or re hues (settlements). 
Used in the sixteenth century to describe someone with a 
university degree or at least some knowledge of law. 
Mapuche word meaning headman, leader. 
Person of mixed white and Indian blood. 
Quechua word meaning 'turn'; conscription of Indian 
labour for public or private work, especially in the mines. 
Quechua word to describe groups of people forcibly 
removed by the Incas within the empire to colonise areas 
recently conquered. Their task was sometimes purely 
military, but they were also engaged in the teaching of 
special skills and customs. The Spaniards found several of 
these colonies in Central Chile. 
Spanish word to denote either Indian settlements or 
relatively small Indian groups. 










Official form filled in to support claims made by 
individuals/litigants. 
Quechua word meaning hillforts, fortified villages built on 
hills; walled corrals. 
Description of deeds presented by individuals to the crown 
to petition awards. 
Farm fields. 
Inquiry carried out by a crown official. 
People living in a neighbourhood, settled members in towns, 
with the right to be members of the Town Council. 
Quechua word to denote a particular group of slaves in pre-
hispanic times, throughout the Inca empire. It was adopted 
by the Spaniards in Chile to designate their own Indian 
slaves, and also, generally, all those who looked like 
Peruvians. 
Quechua word for evil men. 
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